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HIPAA'S Privacy Rule and State Privacy Laws:
Roadblocks to Medical Organizations' Self-Policing
Expert Medical Testimony
Miles J. Zaremski0
Douglas M Belofskyf
"And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well
as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not
be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy
secrets." - Hippocratic Oath
I. INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years ago, Russell M. Pelton published an article titled "Medical
Societies' Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert Testimony."
Pelton
addressed the "current medical malpractice maelstrom," observing that "at
least from the perspective of the medical profession, a crisis of unprecedented
* Miles J. Zaremski, Zaremski Law Group, Highland Park, Illinois, has been a member of the
Illinois Bar for 46 years, concentrating in healthcare law. A graduate of Case Western
Reserve Law School, he is an author and lecturer with a national and global presence, and
has held various faculty (adjunct) positions, including at the law schools of the University of
Chicago, Case Western Reserve, Stetson University, the Macquarie Law School in Sydney,
Australia, and the Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science (Chicago Medical
School). He is the longest serving chair of the ABA's Standing Conmiittee on Medical
Professional Liability, and the first president of the American College of Legal Medicine not
to hold both an MD and JD. He received his BS from the University of Illinois. He was
called upon to advise Members of Congress on federal healthcare legislation, including The
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act and the Affordable Care Act. Before withdrawing, he
served as lead counsel representing the respondent expert in the case of Barrash v. AANS in
the Federal District Court.
Douglas M. Belofsky, Law Offices of Douglas Belofsky, P.C., Northbrook, Illinois, has
been a member of the Illinois Bar for 32 years, concentrating in commercial litigation and
health care litigation. He is a 1983 graduate of the University of Chicago and a 1986
graduate of Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. He is an arbitrator and
mediator for the American Health Lawyers Association and is also an arbitrator for the
American Arbitration Association. He served as counsel representing the respondent expert
in the case of Barrashv. AANS in the Federal District Court and the subsequent appeal to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. See generally Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies' Self-Policing of Unprofessional
Expert Testimony, 13 ANNALs HEALTH L. 549 (2004).
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magnitude is upon us." He posited that "[a]t least some percentage of the
current medical malpractice crisis is a direct result of unprofessional,
sometimes outrageous, 'expert' testimony offered by members ofthe medical
profession and, just as importantly, the inability or refusal of responsible
parties to seriously police that conduct."0 Pelton advocated self-regulation
by the medical profession, and cited as a benchmark the program that had
been ado ted by the American Association of Neurological Surgeons, Inc.
(AANS).u The AANS pioneered the establishment of rules for its members'
expert testimony as well as grievance procedures for alleged violations of
those rules (Professional Conduct Programs).0
The AANS was reacting to the medical malpractice "crisis" of the early
1970s caused by spikes in insurance premiums for providers and the number
of medical malpractice claims brought against them.0 Thereafter, the tort
reform effort grew in various venues,0 including civil justice reforms seeking
to reign in and oversee expert testimony the sine qua non for success or
failure in a medical malpractice lawsuit.d Policing medical professionals'
2. Id. at 549.
3.
Id. at 549-50.
4. See Id at 554 (stating that AANS's program has been endorsed by the courts and the
AMA and is the leading program in the country used to discipline member physicians).
5.
AM. Ass'N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, The AANS ProfessionalConduct Program
(Feb. 2011), https://www.aans.org//media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANSProfessionalConduct Program Overvie
w_2-2011.ashx?la=en&hash=8E78BF0942FD23565E2683EE39BO61B24773FD76 (stating
that the AANS established its Professional Conduct Program in 1983 to provide a forum and
due process procedures to evaluate complaints by one AANS member against another. The
AANS Rules for Neurosurgical Medical/Legal Expert Opinion Services were adopted by the
AANS in 2003); AM. Ass'N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, Rules for Neurosurgical
Medical/LegalExpert Opinion Services (Feb. 2011) https://www.aans.org//media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANSNeurosurgical MedicalLegal Expert Opinion Services_3-222006.ashx?la=en&hash=A537337F65481F7C62EC64287BB007C2162F8E80 [hereinafter
AANSRules for Expert Opinion] (outlining rules for providing expert testimony); AM. Ass'N
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, Procedural Guidelines of the Professional Conduct Committee

of the American Association ofNeurological Surgeons (Nov. 2014) https://www. aans. org//media/lmages/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANSProfessionalConductCommitteeProce
dural Guidelines 11-222014.ashx?la=en&hash=E3580000B8329FO6DB4B IEFDDD9CCFD34E161391 [hereinafter
AANS ProceduralGuidelines] (providing rules and procedures of professional conduct).
6.
Mark A. Hofmann Movement Began With Med Mal Crisis in Early 1970s, BUS. INS.
(Feb. 15, 2004, 12:00 AM),
https:www.businessinsurance.conarticle/20040215/ISSUE03/100014138/movement-beganwith-med-mal-crisis-in-early-1970s; Pelton, supra note 1, at 549 (arguing that physicians
willing to swear under oath that an injury occurred contribute to more medical malpractice
claims being filed)).
7.
See Hofmann, supra note 6 (outlining the various events, government, and interest
groups that contributed the evolution of tort reform).
8.
See generally Bruce Patsner, The Physician as Expert Witness: Essential But Who
Regulates?, HEALTH L. PERSPS. (2008) (stating that the judicial and legislative systems as
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involvement in litigation by their own medical societies was one approach to
do this.0
The AANS describes why its Professional Conduct Program was
established on its website: ". . . to provide a forum and due process
procedures to evaluate complaints lodged by one AANS member against
another and to make recommendations to the AANS Board of Directors for
action (dismissal or sanctions) on such complaints."O The AANS' rules for
medical expert opinion services ". . . are intended to ensure a standard of
quality and impartiality in expert testimony provided by neurosurgeons on
either side of professional liability cases.
Several other organizations, as referenced in the pages that follow, have
adopted Professional Conduct Programs to address members that wish to
offer expert opinion in adversarial proceedings, regardless of the venue. 5
The type of "policing" of expert medical testimony that Pelton advocated is
reflected in the rules of these organizations, which establish standards for
how their members should offer expert testimony. 5 Additional rules have
been adopted to provide for the investigation of a charge that a member's
expert testimony violated an organization's standards and for hearings on
those charges if necessary.0 Proceedings under these programs are typically
initiated by a grievance filed by a defendant in a medical malpractice claim,
whether victorious or not, who feels aggrieved by an opposing expert's
opinions on the medical care provided to the patient who asserted the
malpractice claim.0 However, to evaluate the grievance, medical records

well as medical professional organizations provide oversight of medical expert witness
testimony).
9.
See Id. (stating that over the past decade medical professional societies have become
more involved in "policing expert witness testimony by their members); See Pelton, supra
note 1, at 549-50 (stating that "[a]t least some percentage of the current medical malpractice
crisis is a direct result of unprofessional, sometimes outrageous, 'expert' testimony offered
by members of the medical profession and, just as importantly, the inability or refusal of
responsible parties to seriously police that conduct.").
10.

AANS Bylaws, AM. Ass'N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, https://www. aans.org/About-

Us/Governance/Bylaws-Codes-and-Guidelines (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
11.

THE AANS PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROGRAM, supranote 5.

12. See sources cited infra note 54 (highlighting a number of organizations that have
adopted Professional Conduct Programs).
13. See generallyAANS Rules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5; see infra notes 39 and
47 (articulating guidance for how an organization's members should offer expert opinions).
14. See, e.g., AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5, at 2-5 (adopting guidelines for
when an expert's testimony may need to be investigated).
15. See e.g., AAOS BoardConsiders Grievancesfiled under the Professional
Compliance Program,AAOS,
https://www.aaos.org/AAOSNow/2018/Mar/YourAAOS/youraaosO6/?ssopc=1 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018) (discussing grievance against John S. Toohey, MD regarding "statements
made... in his initial and second expert reports and deposition testimony as an expert in a
medical liability lawsuit").
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and information relating to the patient must be presented by both the treating
physician and the opposing expert.0 Much of that evidence would have been
obtained in discovery but not entered into the public record for the underlying
malpractice case, even if the case went to trial and both the treating physician
and the expert testified.0 Typically, the patients whose treatment is at issue
are not advised of a subsequent grievance filed by their treating physicians
before a medical society, nor are they asked to authorize the submission of
their medical records.0
Even before Pelton raised his concerns about the medical malpractice
"maelstrom," the judiciary had taken steps to emphasize its gatekeeping
function in the use of expert testimony. 5 In the 1993 decision in Daubertv.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the Supreme Court noted that "under the
[Federal Rules of Evidence,] the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."
Since the Daubertdecision, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has been amended
to ensure that an expert may only testify to his or her opinion when the
opinion "is based on sufficient facts or data," the opinion "is the product of
reliable principles and methods" and "the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case."O
Pelton recognized that the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),O and what is commonly known
as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 5 imposed limits on the medical evidence
available to Professional Conduct Programs.0 But Pelton doubted that they
would "compromise the effectiveness" of those Programs, claiming:
Under the AANS' program, testimony is never reviewed until the
underlying litigation is completed, in order to obviate any charge of
witness tampering. As a result, typically the challenged testimony and
related medical evidence have already been made a matter of public record
in the trial and are no longer confidential. In addition, in those instances
16.
See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5, at 1; see PROF'L COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, infra note 52, at 7 (outlining what information is

provided to Committee members when reviewing grievances).
17. See infra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
18. But see infra note 69 (emphasizing that the patient whose medical records were
used in Brandnerdid not authorize their submission and raised HIPAA privacy concerns).
19.
Cynthia H. Cwik, Guardingthe Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25 LITIG. 6, 6
(1999) (discussing the importance of expert evidence and the unique challenges expert
evidence presents to judges, juries, and litigators).
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
21.

FED. R. EVID. 702(b)-(d).

22. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
23.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013).
24. Pelton, supra note 1, at 559.
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where some evidence ijnot a matter of public record it is not difficult to
have it depersonalized.L
This article argues that the HIPAA Privacy Rule and state privacy laws do,
however, impose substantial roadblocks to the work of Professional Conduct
Programs, prohibiting them from examining most of the medical evidence
underlying expert medical testimony in most cases. The HIPAA Privacy
Rule established a foundation of federal protection for protected health
information (PHI), balancing the need to protect such information with the
need to avoid unnecessary barriers in delivering quality health care by
providing exceptions to protecting such PHI. The Rule generally prohibits
"covered entities," defined as health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and
healthcare providers, from disclosing a patient's PHI.0 It allows the use and
disclosure of PHI for certain health care operations, such as administrative,
billing, legal and quality improvement activities.0 PHI may be disclosed to
an insurance company or hospital in an invoice, or to a law firm representing
the patient, or to a provider's peer review committee for an investigation into
care and treatment.0 States such as Illinois have imposed stricter privacy
requirements upon providers than the HIPAA Privacy Rule.0 Patients can
thus expect that providers will only use and disclose their health care
information when necessary for treatment, payment, and, health care
operations.0 They do not expect, nor does the HIPAA Privacy Rule or
Illinois law permit, the disclosure of PHI to a private organization to evaluate
the expert medical opinions offered in medical malpractice claims to which
the patients were parties.u
Despite the sanguine approach to patient privacy advocated by Pelton and
codified in some Professional Conduct Programs' rules, the identity of the
patient behind a medical malpractice claim can usually be found through

25.
Pelton, supra note 1, at 559.
26.
When HIPAA covered entities can disclose protectedhealth information to public
health authorities,PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY,

https://www.phe.gov/about/OPP/dhsp/Pages/hipaa-policybrief.aspx (last reviewed by
website publisher Apr. 21, 2016).
27.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); Beard v. City of Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 2d 872, 873
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
28.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); Beard, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
29.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2013).
30.
See Medical Patient Rights Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (d) (2015) (establishing

patients' right to privacy and confidentiality of records, including restrictions on disclosures
by physicians, health care providers, health services corporations and insurance companies).
31.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1) (2013) (stating that "a covered entity may obtain consent
of the individual to use or disclose protected health information to carry out treatment,
payment, or health care operations").
32.

Supra note 29 (listing permitted disclosures under the HIPAA Privacy Rule); supra

note 30 (listing permitted disclosures under the Medical Patient Rights Act).
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simple internet searches of the docket for the malpractice cases giving rise to
these grievances. 5 Additionally, many commercial entities maintain
searchable databases of personal injury cases, which includes information
such as the names of the parties, their attorneys and their experts as well as
summaries of the allegations, the injuries, and the resolutions.6 The ease
with which the identity of the patient can be found makes it nearly impossible
for a treating physician to comply with the "de-identification" requirement
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule when PHI is submitted to a Professional Conduct
Program.0 Physicians against whom a malpractice claim has been brought
thus routinely breach the Rule and state privacy laws when they submit PHI
in support of grievances they initiate against the experts who testified against
them.
Recent litigation over Professional Conduct Programs has confirmed that
public policy favors the self-policing of expert testimony by medical
societies.0 This is a Hobson's choice between the ability of medical societies
to self-police and a patent's privacy under HIPAA.
There are solutions for this dilemma, which include amending
Professional Conduct Programs' rules to require a patient's written
authorization before the submission of his or her PHI or amending the
HIPAA Privacy Rule to exempt Professional Conduct Programs from its
requirements. This article will conclude that the best solution is to amend
Professional Conduct Programs to require written authorizations from
patients whose PHI will be examined due to the difficulty of amending the
Rule and the varied requirements of state privacy laws, such as those in
Illinois.
This article will first provide a means to identifying the problem, its
severity in general and its effect on patients. It will also discuss the best
method for practitioners and courts to address the "standoff' between public
policy that favors private entities corralling inappropriate expert medical
testimony and privacy laws that ensure the medical privacy of individuals as
patients. Additionally, this article will also address the HIPAA Privacy
Rule's pre-emptive effect on state privacy laws that may be more stringent
33.
The plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit is generally the recipient of the medical
treatment that gave rise to the claim and is thus listed as a party on the docket.
34.

See, e.g., JURY VERDICT REPORTER, https://wwwjuryverdictreporters.com (last

visited Nov. 15 2018) (allowing people to click on a link which lists the details of a personal
injury case including party names and settlements/verdicts); See also VERDICTSEARCH,
https://www.verdictsearch.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (allowing people to estimate
damages, research expert witnesses and opposing counsel, project trial success, and analyze
insurers' settlement offers).
35. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013) (listing the requirements for deidentification).
36.
Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2001)
(determining that self-regulation furthers, rather than impedes, the cause ofjustice).
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than that Rule.
Illinois is the Petri dish for analysis since the state is a bastion for the
headquarters of notable medical specialty organizations such as the AANS,
the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS), and the
American Medical Association (AMA).O
Moreover, because Illinois'
privacy law is stricter than the HIPAA Privacy Rule, courts may use its state
law rather than the Rule in deciding whether there has been an unauthorized
disclosure of PHI. 5 Thus, Illinois law will be a focus to demonstrate how
other states may wish to confront these privacy issues and their relationship
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
II. PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATIONS' STANDARDS FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY

The AMA's code of ethics recites: "medical evidence is critical in a variety
of legal and administrative proceedings. As citizens and professionals with
specialized knowledge and experience, physicians have an obligation to
assist in the administration of justice."'
The code of ethics requires
physicians who testify as expert witnesses to "[e]valuate cases objectively
and provide an independent opinion."O It provides that: "organized
medicine, including state and specialty societies and medical licensing
boards, has a responsibility to maintain high standards for medical witnesses
by assessing claims of false or misleading testimony and issuing disciplinary
sanctions as appropriate." 0
The AANS' "Rules for Neurosurgical Medical/Legal Expert Opinion
Services" apply to its members that choose to offer opinions as an expert
witness in legal or administrative proceedings, either by way of sworn
statements, depositions, or during an adversarial proceeding like a trial. 5 In

37.
See Contact Us, AM. ASS'N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS,
https://www.aans.org/Contact (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the Executive

Office of the Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons is located in Rolling Meadows, Ill.); See
Contact the A40S, AM. ASS'N OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, https://www.aaos.org/contactus/

(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the AAOS headquarters is located in Rosemont,
Ill.); See Contact Us, AM. MED. Ass'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/eform/submit/contact-us
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the contact address for the Am. Med. Ass'n is in

Chicago, Ill.).
38.

Supra note 35; See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMW. STAT. 530/5 (2017) (showing that the Ill.

statute has a broader definition of what constitutes protected personal information than
HIPAA).
39.
CODE OF MED. ETHICS, at 22 (AM. MED. Ass'N 2016).
40.
Id. at 23.
41.
Id.
42.
AANSRules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5; See also Standards of

Professionalism: Orthopaedic Expert Opinion and Testimony AM. AcAD. ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGEONS/AM. Ass'N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS(20 10),

https://www.aaos.org/member/profcomp/ewtestimony May_2010.pdf [hereinafter AAOS
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM] (describing how an orthopedic surgeon can provide an
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the Rules, the AANS acknowledges that "[t]he American legal system often
calls for expert medical testimony.0 Proper functioning of this system
requires that when such testimony is needed, it be truly expert, impartial and
available to all litigants."O The AANS' rules for such testimony are
organized under three headings: "Impartial Testimony", "Subject Matter
Knowledge" and "Compensation."0
The rules relating to Impartial
Testimony include the requirement that an expert "be an impartial educator
for attorneys, jurors and the court on the subject of neurosurgical practice."0
The AAOS has adopted its own "Standards of Professionalism" for
Orthopaedic Expert Opinion and Testimony.0 In those Standards, the AAOS
recognizes that:
It is in the public interest for orthopaedic testimony and medical opinions
to be readily available, knowledgeable and objective. As a member of the
orthopaedic profession, an orthopaedic surgeon must recognize a
responsibility to provide testimony and expert medical opinions that are
truthful, scientific ly correct and appropriate for the context of the issues
being considered.
The AAOS Standards apply to members "who provide expert opinions,
testimony and other services. . . in the context of administrative, civil or
criminal matters, [including]. . . writing expert opinions, signing certificates
or affidavits of merit, reviewing medical records, and providing sworn
testimony."E These Standards are drawn from the AAOS' Code of Medical
Ethics and Professionalism, which include the requirement that "[i]n
providing opinions, the orthopaedic surgeon should ensure that the opinion
provided is non-partisan, scientifically correct, and clinically accurate."O
They include a "Mandatory Standard" that an expert witness shall provide
oral or written medical testimony or expert medical opinions in "a fair and
impartial manner."El
Both the AANS and the AAOS have established grievance procedures
through which one member can make a complaint against another for an
alleged violation of their associations' standards for expert testimony. 5 A
opinion as an expert witness).
43.
44.

AANSRules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5.
Id.

45.

Id

46.

Id

47.
48.

See generallyAAOS STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 42.
Id

49.

Id

50.
CODE OF MED. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM FOR ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, (AM.
ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS/AM. Ass'N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 2011).

51.
52.

See AAOS STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 42.
See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF'L COMPLIANCE
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member who is found to have violated those standards can be censured,
suspended, or expelled from the organization. 5
Other or anizations,
particularly those located in Illinois, have similar procedures.
Typically,
the complaint is heard by a designated committee, which makes
recommendations to the organization's board of directors.0
The
organizations routinely receive and review medical records and information
concerning the treatment of a patient by a member who is bringing charges
against an expert that testified against said member.0 The accused member
can appeal an adverse decision made by the board of directors to the
membership at large.0
III. THE SUBMISSION OF PHI TO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROGRAMS

A handful of physicians who have been sanctioned by Professional
Conduct Programs for their expert testimony have attempted to challenge
their sanctions, with a notable lack of success. 5 Courts are deferential to the

PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (AM. Ass'N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 2018).

53.

See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF'L COMPLIANCE

PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52.

54.
See American College of Surgeons, Statement on the PhysicianActing as an Expert
Witness, 96 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 1, 1 (2011); see also CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AM. SOC'Y
OF PLASTIC SURGEONS (AM. SoC'Y PLASTIC SURGEONS 2017) (relating to "Expert Testimony"
and "Enforcement"); see also Roger C. Bone & Edward C. Rosenow, ACCP Guidelinesfor
an Expert Witness, 98 CHEST 1006, 1006 (1990); see also GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT WITNESS
QUALIFICATIONS AND TESTIMONY, (AM. Soc'Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 2013); see also AM.
SoC'Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (ASA) EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY REVIEW PROGRAM

COMPLAINT FORM (AM. SoC'Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 2012); see also Commrittee on Medical
Liability, Guidelinesfor Expert Witness Testimony in Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 109
AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 974, 977 (2002); see also Stephan R. Paul & Sandeep K. Narang,
Expert Witness Participationin Civil and CriminalProceedings, 139 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS

1, 1 (2017) (stating that "[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) first articulated a
policy on appropriate medical expert testimony in 1989 [citation omitted] and was among
the first medical specialty societies to do so." Other revisions took place in 1994 according
to expert witness guidelines from the Council of Medical Specialty Societies [citation
omitted] and, thereafter, through 2016"); see also B. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in
MedicalMalpracticeLitigation, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 383, 385
(2009) (showing that since 1983, it was reported that through 2007 ". . at least 18 other

societies had followed the lead of the AANS") (citing to Andrew D. Feld & William D.
Carey, Expert Witness Malfeasance: How Should Specialty Medical Societies Respond?, 100
AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 991, 995 (2005); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M.
Studdert, Role ofProfessionalOrganizationsin Regulating Physician Expert Witness
Testimony, 298 JAMA 2907, 2909 (2007)).
55.
See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF'L COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52.
56.
See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF'L COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52.
57.
See AANS ProceduralGuidelines, supra note 5 at 6; see also PROF'L COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52, at 20.
58.
Barrashv. American Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., 812 F.3d 416 (5th Cir.
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organizations' attempts to police their members' expert testimony. 5 Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Austin v. American Association of
NeurologicalSurgeons,0 stated:
By becoming a member of the prestigious American Association of
Neurological Surgeons, a fact he did not neglect to mention in his
testimony in the malpractice suit against Ditmore, Austin boosted his
credibility as an expert witness. The Association had an interest-the
community at large had an interest-in Austin's not being able to use his
membership to dazzle judges and juries and deflect the close and skeptical
scrutiny that shoddy testimony deserves. It is no answer that judges can be
trusted to keep out such testimony. Judges are not experts in any field
except law. Much escapes us, especially in a highly technical field, such as
neurosurgery. When a member of a prestigious professional association
makes representations not on their face absurd, such as that a majority of
neurosurgeons believe that a particular type of mishap is invariably the
result of surgical negligence, the judge may have no basis for qtu tioning
the belief, even if the defendant's expert testifies to the contrary.
An issue apparently not addressed by the courts or in legal literature,
however, is the use of PHI by organizations such as the AANS when
evaluating whether their members violated their standards for providing
expert testimony. Examining the judicial records developed in the handful
of cases where experts attempted to challenge sanctions entered by
Professional Conduct Programs shows that the submission of PHI is
pervasive. Those records are easily accessible using the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. In each case, the parties' efforts
to de-identify the PHI submitted in support of a grievance fell short, leaving
the PHI of a patient hiding in plain sight in the public record.
The difficulty of de-identification can be seen in the opinion of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Brandner v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, addressing an orthopaedic surgeon's
unsuccessful challenge to his suspension from the AAOS for violating its
2016) (applying Tex. law); Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 760 F.3d 627,
627-30 (7th Cir. 2014); Graboffv. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Pa.
law); Austin, supra note 36, 253 F.3d at 968 (applying Ill. law).
59. See Brandner, 760 F.3d at 628 (refusing to review the AAOS' suspension of an
orthopedic surgeon because it was "a private group, and Illinois ... does not allow judicial
review of a private group's membership decisions unless membership is an 'economic
necessity' or affects 'important economic interests'); see also Barrash, 812 F.3d at 416;
Graboff, 744 F.3d at 128.
60. See Austin, supra note 36.
61. Id. at 972-73; See also Matthew Passen, ProfessionalSelf-Regulation or Witness
Intimidation?, CHI. B. Ass'N REc. 50 (May 2008) (providing an overview of suits by
physicians against peer review organizations for disciplinary actions associated with expert
testimony).
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standards for expert testimony. 5 In that opinion, the patient, the plaintiff in
the medical malpractice case giving rise to the expert's suspension, was never
identified. 5
However, the opinion did disclose certain medical information about the
patient, along with information sufficient to locate the docket of the
malpractice case and, hence, the name of the patient. The opinion recited:
"[i]n October 2004, Brandner was contacted to perform a records review and
provide possible expert testimony in a medical malpractice case in Arizona.
A minor patient was suing Dr. Kipling Sharpe for nerve damage that occurred
durin asurgery, a proximal tibial osteotomy, he performed on the patient's
leg."U An internet search reveals where in Arizona Dr. Sharpe practices
medicine. 0 An online docket search for the Arizona state court in Dr.
Sharpe's urisdiction reveals the malpractice case and the name of the minor
patient.
Indeed, the pleadings that Dr. Brandner filed in the District Court alleged
that Dr. Sharpe had not complied with the HIPAA Privacy Rule's patient deidentification requirements in his grievance report to the AAOS.0 An
affidavit submitted by the AAOS' assistant general counsel addressed that
deficiency, which was deemed rectified when Dr. Sharpe "resubmitted his
grievance materials and de-identified the patient information." 5 Dr. Sharpe
also submitted fourteen pages of his treatment notes for his patient to the
62.
Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 2012 WL
4483820 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2012), aff'd, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014).
63. Id
64. Id at *2.
65.

See Health: Dr. Kipling Sharpe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

https://health.usnews.com/doctors/kipling-sharpe-372416 (last visited Nov. 15, 2018)
(demonstrating that the first result of a basic Google search yields that Dr. Kipling Sharpe
practices in Gilbert, Ariz., in Maricopa County).
66.

THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF ARIZONA, MARICOPA COUNTY: DOCKET CIVIL COURT

CASES, http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp (last
visited Oct. 11, 2018). The website for the Superior Court in Maricopa County allows
anyone to search for a case in which Dr. Sharpe was a party. See
www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp. The district
court's opinion in Brandner contains sufficient details of the proceedings in the malpractice
case filed against Dr. Sharpe to confirm the identity of the plaintiffs. The opinion recites that
Dr. Brandner was first consulted in October 2004, testified at his deposition on August 5,
2004 and testified at trial on April 29, 2008. Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 at *2-3. A search
of the docket for the Superior Court in Maricopa County reveals seven cases filed against Dr.
Sharpe. Two were filed in 2003, and one was filed in 2004. Of those three, only one went to
trial in April 2008.
67.
Complaint ¶ 52, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary
judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) (Document No. 6, filed Dec. 30, 2010 which canbe found
on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).
68.
Affidavit of Melissa A. Young ¶ 29, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting
summary judgment) (No. 1: 10-cv-08161) [hereinafter Young Affidavit] (Document No. 74,
filed Nov. 22, 2011) (document can be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2020

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 28 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

160

Vol. 28

AAOS, with only the patient's name and date of birth redacted.0 Those notes
detailed the patient's medical complaints, the history of his leg injury, the
results of examinations, tests and x-rays, Dr. Sharpe's diagnoses and
treatment plans and the patient's post-surgical complications.0 Dr. Sharpe's
grievance report also contained a portion of the patient's deposition
transcript, which identified the jurisdiction in which the case had been filed,
the names of all of the defendants, and the attorneys representing the
parties.0 Even the record of the District Court's proceedings on Dr.
Brandner's claims against the AAOS contains vast amounts of PHI, which
was contained in the affidavit submitted by the AAOS assistant general
counsel.0 The affidavit contained exhibits of Dr. Sharpe's grievance report,
excerpts from the deposition, and trial testimony of the parties and their
medical experts, all of which detailed the medical condition and treatment of
Dr. Sharpe's easily-identified patient.0
Moreover, the affidavit submitted by the AAOS' assistant general counsel
acknowledged that the attorney for Dr. Sharpe's patient had raised HIPAA
objections to the AAOS proceedings.0 Dr. Brandner complained that he had
no access to the records he had reviewed in the malpractice case because "the
patient's attorney refused to produce the materials because of privacy
concerns under HIPAA."E
One of the documents that Dr. Brandner
submitted to the AAOS recited that the patient's attorney had sent Dr. Sharpe
a letter notifying him that he was violating the plaintiff s HIPAA rights and
demanding the return of all of the patient's records submitted to third
parties.0 The record is unclear as to what, if anything, the AAOS or Dr.
69. Young Affidavit supranote 68, at Exhibit 7.
70. Id.
71. Young Affidavit, supra note 68, ¶ 33; See Young Affidavit at Exhibit 8, at 3,
Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161)
(Document No. 74-8) (detailing the names of the attorneys who represented the parties);
Young Affidavit at Exhibit 6 (Document No. 74-6, filed Nov. 22, 2011) (all documents can
be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).
72. Young Affidavit, supra note 68.
73. See Young Affidavit at Exhibit 6, supra note 68 (including Dr. Sharpe's' grievance
report); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 7, supra note 68 (including Dr. Sharpe's treatment
notes); Young Affidavit, supra note 68, ¶ 33 (including excerpts of plaintiff's deposition
transcript); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 11, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting
summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) (Document No. 74-11, filed Nov. 22, 2011
(including excerpts of Dr. Brandner's deposition transcript); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 14
(Document No. 74-14, filed Nov. 22, 2011 with excerpts of plaintiff's trial testimony);
Young Affidavit at Exhibit 26 (Document No. 74-26 with transcript of the hearing on Dr.
Sharpe's grievance before the AAOS Comm. on Professionalism) (all documents can be
found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).
74. Young Affidavit at ¶ 63.
75.

Id.

76. Young Affidavit at Exhibit 22, at 3, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting
summary judgment) (No. 1: 10-cv-08161) (Document No. 74-22, filed Nov. 22, 2011
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Sharpe did in response to those allegations of violations of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.0
The record of the District Court proceedings in Barrash v. American
Association ofNeurological Surgeons, Inc. also demonstrates how pervasive
the submission of PHI is, at least to the AANS' Professional Conduct
Program.B In 2013, the Executive Director of the AANS submitted an
affidavit in that case as part of the AANS' efforts to resist the plaintiffs
attempts to review all of the grievance files from its Professional Conduct
Program. 5 The affidavit recited that a typical grievance file consisted of at
least one thousand pages of documents, including medical records,
deposition transcripts, and trial transcripts submitted by the parties. 8 The
brief submitted by the AANS in opposition to the plaintiffs motion noted
that, as of 2013, sixty-six grievances had been filed with its Professional

(document can be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).
77.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Graboffv. Colleran Firm highlights the difficulty in
protecting the identity of another patient whose treatment was at issue in a grievance
proceeding. Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 2014). The case involved an
AAOS member's challenge to his two-year suspension from the organization after it found
that he had violated its standards for expert testimony in a malpractice case filed against Dr.
Menachem Meller. Id. at 13 1-32. The opinion did not name the patient, but recited: "In 2007,
Dr. Graboff drafted an expert report that was used in Jones v. Meller, a malpractice case
against Dr. Meller filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Pennsylvania." Id at 132. The patient's full name can be found by searching for cases filed
against Dr. Meller using the "Civil Docket Access link" at
www.courts.phila.gov/publicaccess. Access to the Public Records of the FirstJudicial
DistrictofPa., THE PHILA. COURTS: FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. OF PA.,

www.courts.phila.gov/publicaccess (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) ("Civil Docket Access Link"
is under "Requests for Case Records of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and
Philadelphia Municipal Court"). Even without knowing that the plaintiff's name was Jones,
the malpractice case at issue in Graboffcan be ascertained from the list of twenty-nine cases
filed against Dr. Meller by reference to the date of Dr. Graboff's report. Moreover, the
public record in the District Court proceedings in Graboff contains documents submitted by
both parties that not only name Dr. Meller's patient, but also disclose the patient's PHI in a
number of ways. Those documents include the initial grievance report filed by Dr. Meller to
the AAOS Commiittee on Professionalism, a letter authored by Dr. Graboff relating to the
patient's malpractice claim, and the report of the AAOS Comiittee on Professionalism on
the grievance, all of which contained extensive discussions of the patient's medical history.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment at
Exhibit B, at 8, Graboff, 744 F.2d 128 (No. 2:10-cv-01710) [hereinafter Memorandum]
(Document 80-4, filed 2/24/12) (showing the grievance report filed by Dr. Meller); Id. at
Exhibit C, at 20 (Document 80-4, filed 2/24/12) (showing the letter authored by Dr.
Graboff); Id. at Exhibit N, at 15 (Document No. 80-7, filed 2/24/12) (all documents can be
found on PACER system for E.D. Pa.).
78. Barrashv. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054, 2014 WL
5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014).
79. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Response to Production
Request at Appendix 3, Barrash, 2014 WL 5628807 (No. 4:13-cv-1054) (Document No. 383, filed 10/15/13 (document canbe found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.).
80. Id ¶6.
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Conduct Program alleging a violation of its Rules for Expert Opinion
Services.0 That brief acknowledged that the AANS's grievance files
contained identifiable PHI, and claimed that the production of those files
"implicates the privacy rights of patients under HIPAA. Absent patient
authorizations, the AANS would be forced to review medical records and
transcripts from all 66 grievance files in order to locate and redact patient
identifying information."
The details of the AANS' proceedings on the grievance filed against Dr.
Barrash show how broadly the PHI submitted in those proceedings was
disseminated to AANS members. The AANS' bylaws permitted Dr. Barrash
to appeal the sanction entered against him to the entire voting membership of
the organization.0 As part of that appeal, the AANS sent each voting
member a statement by Dr. Barrash and a response in support of the sanction
written by the president of the organization (See Appendix A).9 Both Dr.
Barrash's statement and the president's response contained extensive
discussion of the PHI of the patient in question, but the president's statement
noted the jurisdiction in which the treating physician had been sued for
malpractice.0 With that information, any member of the AANS could
determine the patient's identity.0
A. Severity of the PHIBreach
PHI of any one patient is important because it is private and confidential
to that person. Accordingly, if PHI appears in a public domain stemming
from any portion of a grievance proceeding that ultimately becomes public,
that leads to that person's identity to be in the public domain. Thus, privacy
boundaries have been crossed. However, determining with any scientific

81. Def.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Compel at 3, Barrashv. Am. Ass'n of Neurological
Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-01054, 2014 WL 5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014) (decision on
cross-motions for summary judgment) (Document No. 38, filed Dec. 15, 2013) (document
can be found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.).
82. Id. at 8.
83. See Barrash, 812 F.3d at 418.
84. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Att. 23 at 16, Barrash, v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological
Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-01054, 2014 WL 5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014) (decision on
cross-motions for summary judgment) (Document No. 78, filed Aug. 8, 2014 with the
portion containing the president's response to Dr. Barrash's appeal included in this article as
Appendix A) (document can be found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.).
85. Id. at 23.
86.
The treating physician was identified only as Dr. Oishi, and the jurisdiction for the
malpractice case filed against him was the "District Court of McLennan County, Texas."
That case can be found through a search begun at www.co.mclennan.tx.us/993/Case-IndexSearch. By simply entering "Oishi" in a search for civil cases, three results with dates of
filing are returned. Knowing the relative dates of the litigation and searching for Dr.
Barrash's name in the docket for the three cases, the relevant case, and thus the name of the
patient can be readily ascertained.
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accuracy just how prevalent this type of disclosure is during any given time
frame can be difficult. Progressing throu h a step-by-step process elucidates
why this problem has not been addressed.
To begin with, the volume and contents of grievances actually filed with
these organizations is unknown.0 To obtain such data generally requires
membership and a member's password or a PIN.0 Next come the
investigations arising from these grievances.0 Only a fraction of grievances
filed may rise to this level.El From there, investigations that result in hearings
may become an even smaller population.0 Even fewer are those cases that
result in sanctioned conduct levied against the offending physicianrespondent.0 Organizations typically make their membership and the public
aware of those physicians so sanctioned, perhajas including the information
in a membership publication or on the Internet.
Lawsuits then challenging
these sanctions are even a smaller lot, with published opinions yet an even
smaller pile.0 Since violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule are not
determinative of an outcome decided by the organization's grievance hearing
committee, it would be an accident or merely fortuitous to uncover any
mention of the Rule in a grievance, for example, as uncovered in the record
in the Brandnercase.0

87.
KATHY BAKICH & KAYE PESTAINA, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO HIPAA PRIVACY
REQUIREMENTS ¶ 215 (Bus. & Legal Res. 2018) (giving an example of document with
scientific data located on it but it was only used for the document and not the data in the

proceeding).
88.

Id. at 214.

89.

Id. at 610 (explaining that online breaches of electronic PHI usually results from

inadvertently enabling online access); see also Steve Emery et al., Compliance in Practice:
MitigatingRisk in Clinics and PhysicianPractices, 81 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. Ass'N
28, 31 (2010).
90.
BAKICH&PESTAINA, supra note 87, at T 610 (describing OCR's investigation

process).
91.
Id
92.
Id; Tammy Worth, Lawsuits for Information BreachesMay Be on the Rise, RENAL
& UROLOGY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.renalandurologynews.com/hipaa-

compliance/hipaa-noncompliance-information-breach-lawsuits-rising/article/706860/
(explaining that doctors traditionally did not have to deal with these types of lawsuits).
93.
BAKICH & PESTAINA, supra note 87, at T 610; see Nadia N. Sawicki, Character,
Competence, and the Principlesof Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 285,

298 (2010) (explaining that medical boards have been criticized for not imposing proper
sanctions on physicians).
94.
See generally RONALD L. KATZ, AM. Soc'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS COMM. ON
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY REVIEW FINDINGS REGARDING EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

(reproduced in the Appendix of this article at Tab B).
95.

FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MED. REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 22

(2016) (depicting the number of doctor's reciprocal actions to imposed sanctions is less than
the number of imposed sanctions).
96. Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 2012 WL
4483820, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2012 Sept. 27, 2012), aff'd, F.3d 627 (7 th Cir. 2014).
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Because of this lack of transparency and the confidential nature of the
proceedings, it is unknown (1) how many grievances are filed by medical
malpractice defendants since the grievances themselves are confidential; and
(2) among those private grievances, how many patients whose care and
treatment formed the basis for a grievance are made aware of the filed
grievance.0 Despite lacking any scientifically sound evidence to make these
determinations, the Brandnerand Barrashcases demonstrate this point, as if
in microcosm to what other similarly situated organizations might have
accumulated and disclosed in their publications.3
Despite that portion of the Hippocratic oath quoted atop this article which
requires physicians hold as "holy secrets" their patients' PHI, the parties
involved in a grievance claimant, claimant's lawyer, respondent,
respondent's lawyer, and the organization with its lawyer - probably give
short shrift to whether or not an investigation and a hearing on a grievance
violates the HIPAA Privacy Rule. As seen in Brandner, many may not care
or may find privacy breaches so unimportant as to never address them as a
determinative issue for the grievance. The physicians who administer
Professional Conduct Programs that accept wrongfully-submitted PHI may
never disclose a violation.
However, as grievances certainly exist and will continue to be filed and
administratively adjudicated, considering a privacy breach is much more than
an academic exercise.E Just because a privacy breach, generally speaking,
is not on the radar of the participants in grievance proceedings does not mean
it is less important and consequential than whether a doctor proffered proper
expert testimony. For instance, a privacy breach could be a possible defense
by the accused expert physician, who could assert that the hearing cannot
proceed because the HIPAA Privacy Rule has been breached absent prior
patient authorization.0 But before landing on this strategy, it is necessary
to define the parameters of the HIPAA Privacy Rule's requirements.
IV.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE

The HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits "covered entities," defined as health
plans healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers, from disclosing
PHI.M
Providers such as doctors, clinics, psychologists, dentists,
97.
See BAKICH & PESTINA, supra note 87, at ¶ 214 (explaining grievance process).
98.
Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014);
Barrashv. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., 812 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2016).
99.
See supraPart I.
100.
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2006).
101.
See Ousterhoutv. Zukowski, No. 11 cv 9136, 2014 WL 804079, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.

Feb. 28, 2014) (showing that patient's consent may be a defense in a privacy violation
complaint).
102.

Id.; Beard v. City of Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 2d 872, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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chiropractors, nursing homes and pharmacies are covered entities.0 Private
organizations like the AANS or AAOS are not themselves subject to the
HIPAA Privacy Rule because they are not covered entities.l
Nor do those private organizations quali as "business associates," as that
term is defined in the HIPAA Privacy Rule.Yd Generally, business associates
are persons or entities that are not employed by a covered entity but perform
certain functions or activities that involve the use or disclosure of PHI
Such functions or activities on behalf of a covered entity include claims
processing, data analysis, utilization review, billing, or the provision of data
storage or hosting services.E
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows covered providers and health plans to
disclose PHI to their business associates if the providers or plans obtain
satisfactory assurances that the business associates will use the information
only for the purposes for which they are en aged by the covered entity and
will safeguard the information from misuse.h Covered entities may disclose
PHI to a business associate only to assist the covered entity in carrying out
its health care functions - not for the business associate's independent use or
purposes.0 Business associates may use or disclose PHI only as permitted
or required by its business associate contract, and may not use or disclose it
in a manner that would violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule if done by a covered
entity.0 Business associate contracts must give a covered entity satisfactory
assurances, in writing, that the business associate will appropriately
safeguard the PHI.0
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities and their business
103.

Are You A Covered Entity?, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,

https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAAACA/AreYouaCoveredEntity.html (last modified June 21, 2016).
104.
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2013) (a healthcare provider is subject to the
Privacy Rule if it furnishes, bills for, or is paid for healthcare in the normal course of
business).
105.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
106.

Business Associates, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.htmil (last
revised Apr. 3, 2003). Changes made by the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) as part of Title XIII of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 included adding a category of business associates' subcontractors,
those that receive, maintain or transmit protected health information on behalf of business
associates. All requirements and obligations that apply to business associates of a covered
entity would also apply to downstream service
providers. https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2013/02/new-hipaaregulations-affect-business-associates.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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associates to protect the confidentiality of "individually identifiable health
information," which is defined as:
information that is a subset of health information, including demographic
information collected from an individual, and:
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer,
or health care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual; and
(i) That identifies the individual; or
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonab basis to believe the
information can be used to identify the individual. W
In nearly all proceedings of Professional Conduct Programs, "there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the
individual" even if the individual's name is redacted from all of the records
submitted by the parties. 2
Information submitted to support these
grievances can be used to identify the patient, including information about
the respondent's expert testimony, the complaining physician's care and
treatment of the patient, where the care was provided and the venue where
the underlying dispute was adjudicated. Thus, even redacted submissions
qualify as "individually identifiable health information" under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule and its submission by covered entities to Professional Conduct
Programs is prohibited. 0
A. Authorized Disclosure ofPHI
Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule generally prohibits the disclosure of
PHI, it does provide for exceptions. 5 Certain of those exceptions permit a
covered entity to obtain an authorization from the patient for the disclosure
of his or her PHI or permit the entity to "de-identify" the patient by following
specified requirements.E
But since de-identification of the patient's identity in a grievance
proceeding is nearly impossible, obtaining an authorization from the patient

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).
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may be the only way his or her PHI can be submitted to a Professional
Conduct Program. In any event, ruiring an authorization should be the
gold standard for every Program. W A patient can, however, revoke an
authorization at any time.0
PHI may also be used or disclosed for a covered entity's treatment
payment, and healthcare operations without written patient authorization.0
"Healthcare operations" include conducting quality assessment and
improvement activities, such as outcome evaluation, development of clinical
guidelines and reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care
A covered entity may also disclose PHI to another covered
professionals.
entity for its own healthcare operations, if each entity either has or had a
relationship with the individual subject of the PHI. The PHI must pertain to
such relationship and the disclosure must be for the purpose of its own and/or
healthcare providers' treatment, payment, or healthcare operations or for
health care fraud and abuse detection and compliance.0 Providers, who are
typically the complainants in a grievance, cannot submit PHI to private
organizations such as the AANS or AAOS under the HIPAA Privacy Rule's
provisions for healthcare operations because those organizations are not
themselves covered entities and have no relationship with patients.0
However, PHI may be disclosed without prior patient authorization in
certain other circumstances. Among them are disclosures for public health
purposes; disclosures by a covered entity that reasonably believes that a
patient is a victim of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; and disclosures
for health oversight activities (e.g., audits, investigations, inspections,
licensure actions, disciplinary proceedings or actions).O For all other
instances, including discovery in a personal injury action in which the patient
is a plaintiff, PHI can be disclosed only if (1) the patient signs a written
authorization to release the PHI or (2) it is subject to a court order. 5
B. "De-Identification"ofPHI
In recognition of the potential utility of health information even when it is
not individually identifiable, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits a covered
entity or its business associates to create information that is not individually

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
C.F.R. §

See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5) (2016).
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1) (2013).
45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2013).
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(4) (2013).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)-(e) (2016).
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2013); 45
164.512(e)(1)(i) (2016).
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identifiable by following certain de-identification standards.0 These
provisions allow the entity to use and disclose information that neither
identifies nor provides a reasonable basis to identify an individual.E
Professional Conduct Programs, either expressly in their rules or as part of
their established practices do require some form of de-identification of PHI
that is submitted to them.2
However, as shown above, the "de-identification" of PHI for use in
Professional Conduct Programs is fraught with difficulties.0 The HIPAA
Privacy Rule's standard for de-identified health information requires that it
"does not identify an individual and.. .there is no reasonable basis to believe
that the information can be used to identify an individual."O The Rule also
provides that: "disclosure of a code or other means of record identification
designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified information to be reidentified constitutes disclosure of protected health information."E As
grievance proceedings typically involve medical malpractice litigation that is
a matter of public record, and, to reiterate from preceding pages, disclose the
name of the malpractice defendant and the plaintiffs medical expert, the
name of the patient can be easily deduced from an online search of the docket
for the court located in the defendant's home jurisdiction or from information

125.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016); see generally Guidance
RegardingMethods for De-identificationofProtectedHealth Information in Accordance
with the Health InsurancePortabilityandAccountabilityAct (HIPAA) PrivacyRule, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Nov. 26, 2012),

https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/hhsdeidguidance.pdf (providing guidance and answering questions
regarding the two methods that can be used to satisfy the Privacy Rule's de-identification
standard).
126.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 125, at 6.
127.
ProceduralGuidelinesfor HandlingEthics ComplaintsAgainst STS Members,
Soc'Y THORACIC SURGEONS, https://www. sts. org/about-sts/policies/procedural-guidelines-

handling-ethics-complaints-against-sts-members (last amended June 7, 2017); AM. Ass'N
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 52, at 7; ProfessionalConductProgram, SoC'Y FOR
VASCULAR SURGERY, https://vascular.org/about-svs/policies/professional-conduct-program
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018).

128.
See generally Letter from William W. Stead, Chair of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital
and Health Statistics, to Thomas E. Price, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health and Human Services
(Feb. 23, 2017) (available at https://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2017-

Ltr-Privacy-Deldentification-Feb-23-Final-w-sig.pdf)
(describing broad challenges with de-identification such as that de-identification is
temporary and can still contain elements which can be used, directly or indirectly, to identify
individuals, as well as weaknesses in the current approaches for de-identification); see also,
Bonnie Kaplan, Selling Health Data: De-Identification, Privacy, and Speech 20 (Yale Inst.

for Soc. and Policy Studies-Bioethics, Working Paper No. 14-024, 2014) ("De-identification
is becoming increasingly untenable as a means of protecting privacy when supposedly
anonymized data can be combined with other identifying data.").
129.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016).
130.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).
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about malpractice cases and experts that are regularly posted online.0 Thus
no matter how well the PHI is de-identified, it can be easily re-identified.W
Indeed, the HIPAA Privacy Rule's standards for de-identification will not be
met if the covered entity has "actual knowledge that the information could be
used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual
who is a subject of the information." 2
C. ProfessionalConduct Programs'Attempts to Comply with the HIPAA
PrivacyRule
The AAOS attempts to address the HIPAA Privacy Rule in its grievance
procedures, which require that: "all grievance material submitted must follow
HIPAA guidelines for de-identifying patient information." 5 Consider as
well the policies of three additional Illinois-based medical organizations, The
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS), the Society for Vascular Surgery (SVS),
and the North American Spine Society (NASS). Paragraph 2 of the STS's
"Procedural Guidelines for Handling Ethics Complaints" states:
Any physician or the Committee may initiate an ethics complaint. It is the
complainant's obligation to provide supporting records and other evidence.
Any such materials must be de-identified and otherwise submitted in
accordance with the applicable privacy regulations issWJ under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
The SVS' Professional Conduct Program states:
The Complainant shall de-identify all Protected Health Information, as that
term is defined in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA"), prior to submitting such information to the Committee.
Protected Health Information that has not been de-identified will be
returned to the Complainant in the absence of patient consent or an
exception to HIPAA's privacy regulations; however, documents or records
which have been admitted into evidence in litigation or filed with any court
are considered a matter of public record and need not be de-identified. . In
the event the Respondent submits Protected Health Information to the

131.
See generally Brandnerv. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161,
2012 WL 4483820 at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2012), aff'd 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014),
Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2014), and Barrashv. Am. Ass'n of
Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-1054, 2014 WL 5162898 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14,
2014).
132.
See Stead, supra note 128, at 8 (discussing ways PHI can be re-identified
indirectly, through changing datasets, or due to inconsistent approaches to de-identification
that provide inconsistent results).
133.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016).
134.
135.
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Committee, said information shall be de-identified by the Respondent.
Protected Health Information that has not been de-identified will be
returned to the Respondent in the absence of patient consent or an
exception to HIPAA's privacy rpilations, or the litigation exception
stated in the preceding paragraph.
Similarly, the NASS' Professional Conduct Procedural Guidelines
provides in pertinent part: Sec. A (2): ". . .the Complainant shall [sic] de
identify all Protected Health Information, as that term is defined in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ('HIPAA') prior to submitting
such information to the Committee."
It then provides language similar to
that provided by the SVS. 5
Few, if any, challenges to a party's compliance with HIPAA's deidentification requirement are found in published legal opinions. There is a
practical problem why including a de-identification requirement in an
organization's expert witness rules is more a facially appealing requirement
than an issue for a court or trier-of-fact to adjudicate- as in Brandner, the
issue is one that has failed to require judicial scrutiny.0 On another level,
as previousl
recognized, administrative hearings are generally
confidential.
The language of a published sanction can identify the patient
on whose behalf the sanctioned provider testified in a medical malpractice
lawsuit as well as some of the details of the medical care provided.0 Of
course, the underlying litigation was already concluded and its record may
not reveal such confidential information.0 The fact that the patient may
never be aware of the use of his or her PHI in private reviews of the testimony
of the expert hired in the patient's medical malpractice case does not make
the breach of his or her expectations of privacy any less egregious.

136.
137.

SOC'Y FOR VASCULAR SURGERY, supra note 127.
ProfessionalConduct ProceduralGuidelines, N. AM. SPINE Soc'y 1, 2 (2018),

https://dnn.spine.org/Portals/0/Documents/WhoWeAre/PCECProceduralGuidelines.pdf?ver=
2017-09-11-143058-837.
138.
Compare N. AM. SPINE Soc'Y, supra note 137 with Soc'Y FOR VASCULAR

SURGERY, supra note 127 (indicating that PHI that has not been de-identified will be
returned to the Complainant in the absence of patient consent or an exception to HIPAA's
privacy regulations).
139.
See supra notes 67-68; see generallysupra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
140.
Compare Am. Soc'y of Anesthesiologists,ASA Member Sanctionedfor Expert
Witness Testimony, 76 ASA MONITOR 46, 46 (2012)
http://monitor.pubs.asahq.org/article.aspx?articleid=2445922 with KATZ, supra note 94

(demonstrating that both administrative hearings and published summaries of administrative
hearings are kept confidential, detailing only the sanction imposed against the offending
physician and the underlying bases for it).
141.
142.

See KATZ, supra note 94.
See KATZ, supra note 94.
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D. Remedies for UnauthorizedDisclosure ofPHI
The unauthorized disclosure of PHI by a covered entity in a grievance
proceeding constitutes a "breach of unsecured protected health information"
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule,[ and triggers a requirement of notifying the
patient and reporting to HHS through its Office of Civil Rights (OCR).O
The covered entity must notify each individual whose PHI has been
"accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed" by the breach and include a
description of what happened, the types of PHI involved, the steps
individuals should take to protect themselves from potential harm resulting
from the breach, and what the covered entity is doing to mitigate harm and
to protect against any further breaches.0 If the breach of unsecured PHI
affects fewer than 500 individuals, a covered entity must notify HHS of the
breach through its web portal within sixty days ofthe end of the calendar year
in which the breach was discovered.E
OCR is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA Privacy Rule and
investigating complaints filed.0 If it accepts a complaint for investigation,
it will notify the person who filed the complaint and the covered entity named
in it. 2 The complainant and the covered entity are then asked to present
information about the incident or problem described in the complaint.E

143.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2009).
144.
45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2009).
145.
Id.
146.
45 C.F.R. § 164.408 (2013); Submitting Notice of a Breach to the Secretary, U.S.
DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-

notification/breach-reporting/index.html (last reviewed Jan. 5, 2015).
147.

How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH

& HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement/examples/how-ocr-enforces-the-hipaa-privacy-and-security-rules/index.html
(last reviewed June 7, 2017); Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement/data/enforcement-highlights/index.html (last reviewed Aug. 17, 2018). The
authors tendered a Freedom of Information Act request on July 23, 2018 to OCR, as clarified
on October 5, 2018, requesting whether any HIPAA Privacy Act violations were filed
against any of the following organizations since mandatory reporting was required in April
2003: American College of Surgeons, American Society of Plastic Surgeons, American
College of Chest Surgeons, American Society of Anesthesiologists, American Academy
Pediatrics, American Association of Neurological Surgeons, American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, Society of Thoracic Surgeons, Society for Vascular Surgery, and
North American Spine Society. The Office of the Secretary of HHS responded on October
15, 2018, as supplemented on November 27, 2018. There was only one filing involving any
of these organizations, but was unrelated to a patient whose PHI was disclosed in a matter
brought against a member of any of these organizations that rendered expert opinions. As of
July 31, 2018, "since the compliance date of the Privacy Rule in April 2003, OCR has
received over 186,453 HIPAA complaints and has initiated over 905 compliance reviews.
[They] have resolved ninety-six percent of these cases (178,834)."
148.
149.
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Covered entities are required by law to cooperate with complaint
investigations.
If the evidence indicates that the covered entity did not
comply, OCR will attempt to resolve the case with the covered entity by
obtaining voluntary compliance, corrective action or a resolution
agreement.E A resolution agreement is a settlement agreement, signed by
HHS and a covered entity or business associate, in which the covered entity
or business associate agrees to perform certain obligations and make reports
to HHS.E The resolution agreement is generally for a period of three
years.E During the jeriod, HHS monitors the covered entity's compliance
with its obligations. W A resolution agreement may include the payment of
a resolution amount.
If HHS cannot reach a satisfactory resolution through
the covered entity's demonstrated compliance or corrective action through
other informal means, including a resolution agreement, civil money
penalties may be imposed for noncompliance.E
OCR concludes most HIPAA Privacy Rule investigations using these
types of resolutions.E The HHS website warns that "if the covered entity
does not take action to resolve the matter in a way that is satisfactor OCR
may decide to impose civil money penalties on the covered entity."
The
HIPAA Privacy Rule, though, does not provide a private cause of action to
individuals affected by a health care privacy breach.l
In addition to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, organizations like the AANS and
AAOS have their own ethical standards that require their members to
maintain the confidentiality of patients' medical information.0 In the

150.
How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147.
151.
How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147; Failure
to Protectthe Health Records ofMillions ofPersons Costs Entity Millions ofDollars, U.S.
DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/12/28/failure-

to-protect-the-health-records-of-millions-of-persons-costs-entity-millions-ofdollars.html?language=es (last revised Dec. 28, 2017).
&

152.
ResolutionAgreements and CivilMoney Penalties, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH
HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-

enforcement/agreements/index.html?language=es (last reviewed Oct. 15, 2018).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147; see also

data referred to in note 147.
158.
How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147.
159.
Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 429 F.Supp.2d 930, 944 (N.D. Ill.
2006).
160.
AANS Code ofEthics, AM. Ass'N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS § (D)(3) (Nov. 22,
2014), https://www.aans.org/-

/media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANSCodeofEthics_11-222014.ashx?la=en&hash=124B159D6B41ACF78DFB0110EB55B10E68D5D3DD

(requiring

its members to "safeguard patient confidentiality and privacy within the constraints of the
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AANS, a grievance alleging a violation of those ethical standards is subject
to the sameBrocedures and claims of violations of their standards for expert
testimony.
V.

ILLINOIS' LAW IS MORE STRINGENT THAN THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE

Until now, the focus of this article has been on the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Equally concerning and problematic for any organization's Professional
Conduct Program is the interplay between federal and state privacy laws.
Typically, federal law preempts state law if the two are concerning the same
subject matter.0 HIPAA supersedes any contrary provisions of state law
subject to certain exceptions, one of which allows state laws to prevail if they
impose requirements more stringent than those of HIPAA.E A state law is
deemed more stringent when it affords patients more control over their
medical records than federal law.0 Illinois' law has been held to be more
stringent,E and Illinois courts have articulated a broad public olicy
protecting the confidentiality of the patient-physician relationship. 10 This
polie is based on Illinois' Medical Privacy Law,E as well as common
law.
Thus, as inPetrillov. Syntex Labs., Inc. and its progeny,0 physicians
are required to maintain the confidentiality of their patients' medical
information even in personal injury litigation in which those patients have
made their own medical condition an issue.E
Illinois codified the physician-patient privilege in its Medical Privacy
Law, which provides: "no physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose
any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a
professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve
law."); Principlesof Medical Ethics and Professionalismin OrthopaedicSurgery, AM.
ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS § V (May 2002),

https://www.aaos.org/uploadedFiles/PreProduction/About/OpinionStatements/ethics/Princi
ples.pdf (stating that "the orthopaedic surgeon should respect the rights of patients, of
colleagues, and of other health professionals and must safeguard patient confidences within
the constraints of the law.").
161.
AM. Ass'N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, supra note 160.
162.
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
163.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2018); Nw. Mem'l
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 939 (7th Cir. 2004).
164.
Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F.Supp.2d 705, 708-709 (D. Md. 2004).
165.
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6,
2004); Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 365 Ill.App.3d 823, 841 (1st Dist. 2006).
166.
Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588-89 (1st Dist. 1986); see
Robersonv. Liu, 198 Ill. App. 3d 332, 336 (5thDist. 1990) (applying the holding in

Petrillo to advance public policy of confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship).
167.
168.
169.
170.
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the patient."0 This prohibition is subject to fourteen enumerated exceptions,
including "in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for
malpractice ."E Illinois courts have held that the Medical Privacy Law's
protections apply even if the patients' names and identification numbers are
redacted from their medical records.0 None of the fourteen enumerated
exceptions to the Medical Privacy Law's privacy protections would apply to
a grievance brought before a professional organization by one physician
against another.El
The Illinois Supreme Court examined the scope and purpose of the
physician-patient privilege in People ex rel. Dept. ofProf Reg. v. Manos.]
The Manos court held that a court could not compel the production of
confidential medical records unless one of the statutory exceptions contained
in the Medical Privacy Law applied: "[t]he legislature established a limited
number of circumstances in which physicians and surgeons are allowed to
produce confidential patient record information. Courts must apply these
existing exceptions and cannot create additional exceptions to the
privilege."3
In Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories,Inc., the Appellate Court recognized a
broad public policy that bars any ex parte communications between an
attorney for a defendant in a personal injury case and the plaintiff s treating
physician.E The Petrillo court stated: "[b]ecause public policy strongly
favors both the confidential and fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
relationship, it is thus axiomatic that conduct which threatens the sanctity of
that relationship runs afoul of public policy."O
Although the Petrillo court recognized that when a patient files suit, the
patient implicitly consents to his or her physician releasing any ofthe medical
information related to the mental or physical condition that the patient has
placed at issue, it held that such consent was limited:
The patient's implicit consent, however, is obviously and necessarily
limited; he consents only to the release of his medical information (relative
to the lawsuit)pursuantto the methods ofdiscovery authorizedby Supreme
Court Rule 201(a). A patient certainly does not, by simply filing suit,
171.
735 ILCS 5/8-802 (2015).
172.
735 ILCS 5/8-802(2) (2015).
173.
See Parksonv. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982)
(deciding that removing patient names and identification numbers from documents is not
compliant with Illinois' Medical Privacy Law); see also Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 Ill. App. 3d
120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (agreeing with the court in Parkson).
174.
735 ILCS 5/8-802 (2015).
175.
People ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 578 (2002).
176.
Id. at 576.
177.
Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588-89 (1st Dist. 1986).
178.
Id. at 588.
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consent to his physician discussing that patient's medical confidences with
third parties outside court authorized discovery methods, nor does he
consent to his physician discussing the patient ' confidences in an ex parte
conference with the patient's legal adversary.1
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the ruling in Petrillo.E
In addition to the protections recognized by Petrillo, Illinois law may
require even stronger privacy protections than the "de-identification"
standard under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 2 In Parkson v. Cent. DuPage
Hosp., the Appellate Court held that merely redacting patients' names and
identifying numbers was insufficient to protect patient confidentiality. 2 The
Court stated: "[t]he patients' admit and discharge summaries arguably
contain histories of the patients' prior and present medical conditions,
information that in the cumulative can make the possibility of recognition
very high." 2 The Illinois Supreme Court echoed that reasoning in People
ex rel. Dept. ofProf Reg. v. Manos: "[e]ven if the names were redacted along
with any other identifying information, the possibility of recognizing and
equating a record to each patient would not be difficult. Thus, it is reasonable
to suggest that merely deleting the patient names and other identifying
information from patient records would violate the physician-patient
privilege." 2 This de-identification requirement may be even stricter than
the one imposed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 2
The Illinois Medical Privac Law does not expressly provide a private
cause of action for its violation.
Decisions from courts outside of Illinois,
however, have recognized state-law claims for the unauthorized disclosure of
private medical information. 2 While it appears that no reported decision of

179.

Id. at 591 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

180.
See Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 198 111. 2d 21, 57 (2001) (quoting Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 458 (1997) (continuing to support the holding from
Petrillo)).
181.
See discussion infra note 185.
182.
Parksonv. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dis. 1982).
183.
Id.
184.
People ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos, supra note 175.
185.
Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013) (stating health information that cannot

reasonably identify an individual is not individually identifiable health information), with
Parkson, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 855 (holding patient-physician privilege would have been
violated had the names and identifying numbers of patients been excluded from a report),
and Manos, 202 Ill. 2d at 563 (discussing that simply deleting names and identification
numbers from patient records would violate physician-patient privilege).
186.

See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-802 (2015) (explaining only exceptions to physician-

patient privilege, not creating a private cause of action).
187.

See, e.g., Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268,

¶

24 (Ohio Ct.

App. 2d Dist. 2015) (showing the independent Ohio tort "for the unauthorized, unprivileged
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has
learned within a physician-patient relationship").
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an Illinois court has addressed this precise issue, there are two bases that
would suggest pleading a violation of this statute, even without an allegation
of actual harm, would be sufficient to state a claim. The first is
the Petrillo line of cases, which suggests that a physician would violate his
or her fiduciary duties to a patient by disclosing PHI to third parties.3 The
second is recent decisional law interpreting Illinois' Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA).O
Last year, a California federal court held in In re Facebook Biometric
Information Privacy Information that under the BIPA, a person need not
suffer an actual injury beyond a violation of his or her right to privacy.E
Illinois law is now in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Stacy
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation.0 The Illinois' high
court held, "an individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse
effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under [BIPA], in order to qualify
as an 'aggrieved' person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to the Act."E This analysis follows the model
established in the AIDS Confidentiality Act.E The Court went on to say
that a person becomes prejudiced or aggrieved, "in the legal sense, when a
legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary interest is
directly affected by the decree orjudgment."E
The analysis and holding in the Illinois Supreme Court's Rosenbach
decision suggests that a strong foundation now exists for a patient's right to
relief under the Illinois' Medical Privacy statute when his or her PHI is
disclosed in a medical organization's administrative proceedings without his
or her authorization. If it is used as precedent, Illinois law appears to
effectively strengthen a cause of action for breach of PHI privacy even if a
patient does not, or cannot, plead actual harm.

188.
See Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 595-96, 499 N.E.2d at 962 (explaining that
[c]ourts which have recognized the existence of a fiduciary relationship between a patient
and his physician have consistently acknowledged that an exparte conference is contrary to
the fiducial obligations owed by a physician.").
189.
740 ILCS 14/ et seq. (2008).
190.
In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 545-547 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
191.
Stacy Rosenbach ex rel. Alexander Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment
Corporation et al., LLC, No. 123186, 2019 WL 323902 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019).
192.
Ex rel. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902 at ¶ 40.
193.
410 ILCS 305/1 etseq. (2016); Id. at ¶ 26, 27.
194.
Ex rel. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902 at ¶ 30 (citing to Glos v. People, 259 Ill. 332,
340 (1913)) (emphasis added); see also Dixonv. Wash. and Jane Smith Cmty.-Beverly,
2018 WL 2445292, *9 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (a complaint states a cause of action where
biometric data was disclosed to an employer's out-of-state, third-party clock vendor of an
employer's time clocks without informing the plaintiff or obtaining the plaintiff's prior
consent.).
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A. Which Jurisdiction'sLaw Applies?
Although this article is focused on Illinois law, the law of other
jurisdictions may be applicable to Professional Conduct Programs. For
instance, although the AANS and AAOS are both based in Illinois, their
proceedings might be held in one or more other states.
Moreover, the state
in which those proceedings are held might not be the state where the
treatment at issue took place.E Illinois follows the Restatement Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1971) in making choice-of-law decisions.0 While it
appears that no reported Illinois decision has addressed which jurisdiction's
laws might apply to a patient's privacy rights in his or her medical
information, Illinois courts have applied Section 139 of the Restatement to
choice of law questions involving evidentiary privileges.0 Section 139
provides:
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which
has the most significant relationship with the communication will be
admitted, even though it would be privileged under the local law of the
forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the
strong public policy of the forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has
the most significant relationship with the communication but which is not
privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is
some special re n why the forum policy favoring admission should not
be given effect.
The comments to Section 139 recite that the state with the most significant
relationship with the communication is usually the state where the
communication took place.
Given Illinois' strong public policy favoring
the privacy of medical information, it seems likely that an Illinois court
would apply Illinois law, even if the state where the physician-patient
relationship took place had less stringent privacy requirements. Since only

195.

For instance, in Brandner, the medical treatment at issue took place in Arizona, as

has been noted above in note 65. The AAOS' grievance proceeding was conducted in
Illinois, but Brandner's appeal hearing was conducted in Louisiana. Young Affidavit at
Exhibits 26 & 32, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary judgment) (No.
1:10-cv-08161) (Document Nos. 74-26 & 74-32, filed Nov. 22, 2011) (documents canbe
found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).
196.
Id.
197.
Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 568 (2000).
198.
Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 373 Ill. App. 3d 652, 667 (2d Dist. 2007);
Sterling Fin. Mgmt., L.P. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 442, 452-53 (1st Dist.
2002).
199.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (AM. LAWINST. 1971).
200.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2020

Id. at cmt. e.

29

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 28 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

178

Vol. 28

the patient would have standing to bring a breach of privacy claim, his or her
choice of forum may also result in the application of the law of a different
state. 2 As there is no "one size fits all" solution to the privacy requirements
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the laws of all fifty states, Professional
Compliance Programs should require a patient to execute a release that
complies with the state law of his or her residence before receiving his or her
PHI regarding a grievance.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME THE PRIVACY ROADBLOCKS

In Austin v. American Association ofNeurologicalSurgeons, Judge Posner
recognized the important public function served by an association's policing
of its members' expert testimony, writing:
We note finally that there is a strong national interest, which we doubt not
that Illinois would embrace, in identifying and sanctioning poor-quality
physicians and thereby improving the quality of health care. Although Dr.
Austin did not treat the malpractice plaintiff for whom he testified, his
testimony at her trial was a type of medical service and if the quality of his
testimony reflected the quality of his medical judgment, he is probably a
poor physician. His discipline by the Association therefore served an
important public policy exemplified by the federal Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 et seq., which encourages hospitals
to conduct professio14review of its staff members and report malpractice
to a federal database.L

Among the rationales for the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
(HCQIA) that Judge Posner was confident that Illinois would embrace were
the public interest in improving quality medical care by decreasing medical
malpractice and providing a means of protecting effective peer review. 2 As

201.

Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, 40 N.E.3d 661, at ¶ 24

(Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2015).
202.
Austin, supra note 36, 253 F.3d at 974.
203.
45 C.F.R.§ 60.3, 60.12(a) (2013); RANDOLPH D. SMOAK JR., REPORT 18 OF THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMERICA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1-98,(AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& LAW), www.aapl.org/expert-witness-testimony (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (showing that

while it is unclear whether it ever was or remains the official position of the AMA, there is a
report of the AMA Board of Trustees that is cited by others for the proposition that the AMA
considers expert witness testimony to be the practice of medicine subject to peer review);
Diaz v. Provena Hosp., 352 Ill. App. 3d. 1165, (App. 2d Dist. 2004) (pet. Iv. app. den'd., 213

Ill. 2d 556 (2005)) (holding that when a physician allows her medical staff privileges at a
hospital to lapse when under a corrective proceeding for inappropriate medical care and
treatment instituted by the hospital, i.e., the physician was "under investigation" by the
hospital, an element under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act's mandatory reporting
requirements was triggered, thus mandating the hospital to file a report with the National
Practitioner's Data Bank (NPDB)). Extrapolating from this analysis, and pursuant to

definitions found in 45 C.F.R. § 60.3, if a professional organization sanctions one of its
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previously noted, covered entities may not disclose PHI to organizations such
as the AANS or AAOS under the HIPAA Privacy Rule's provisions for
healthcare operations.l Thus, even if their Professional Conduct Programs
qualified as peer-review programs under HCQIA as furthering quality health
care, they would not be entitled to review any PHI for those purposes. 2
The standoff between protecting PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and
private medical organizations continuing to advance public policy by
policing expert medical testimony thus remains a very real concern, despite
there not being any objectively identifiable data to confirm its presence.E
As long as there is expert testimony to substantiate or defend an adversarial
proceeding, the risk of apparently inappropriate expert witness testimony that
could result in the filing of grievances will always remain. But by doing so,
grievances continue to breach the HIPAA Privacy Rule by failing to deidentify the patient whose care and treatment becomes the underpinning for

members for rendering expert medical testimony not in conformance with the organization's
rules or regulations governing such testimony, its sanction may well be reportable to the
NPDB if the organization is deemed to be a professional society "of health care practitioners
that engages in professional review activity through a formal peer review process, for the
purpose of furthering quality health care" and the sanction was entered "in the course of
professional review activity" and was "[b]ased on the professional competence or
professional conduct of an individual health care practitioner which affects or could affect
adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients"; see, e.g., Committee on Medical
Liability, Guidelinesfor Expert Witness Testimony in Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 109
PEDIATRICS 974, 976 (2002) (highlighting "the important role of medical societies and
licensing boards in maintaining the integrity of physicians who provide expert witness
testimony"); compare Fullertonv. Florida Med. Ass'n, Inc., 938 So. 2d 587, 593 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006) ("The narrow question we must address is whether HCQIA can be
reasonably construed as authorizing peer review of a physician's testimony given in a
medical-malpractice action for the purpose of furthering the quality of health care. In our
judgment, it cannot."); declining to extend this holding, see In re Higby, 414 S.W. 3d 771,
783 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 2013) (stating that providing expert opinion testimony and opinions
implicates the competence of a physician, which falls within the purview of the American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) Grievance Committee, which is styled after
the HCQIA).
204. See 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014) (defining covered entities); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.502(a) (2013) (HIPAA privacy rule); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) (Health
care operations exception to Privacy Rule under HIPAA).
205.
42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(a)(1) (1986); 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014); see also Brownv.
Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996) (illustrating further
that for HCQIA immunity to apply to a professional review body, the review action must be
taken "in furtherance of quality health care").
206.
See Stead, supra note 128, at 2 (citing De-Identificationand the Health Insurance
PortabilityandAccountabilityAct (HIPAA), Hearing Before the NCVHS Subcomm. on
Privacy, Confidentiality& Security of the Dep't. ofHealth and Human Services, (2016)
(statement of Daniel Barth-Jones), http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/transcripts-minutes/transcriptof-the-may-24-2016-ncvhs-subcomiittee-on-privacy-confidentiality-security-hearing/)
("Expert testimony at our hearing suggested that the goals of preserving the individual's
right to privacy while fully using digital information to improve health and outcomes may be
on a 'collision course'.").
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such a proceeding. Again, the de-identification requirements of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule remain instructive, as they set forth the standard for deidentification of PHI.E
As noted earlier in this article, PHI is not
individually identifiable if it does not disclose the identity of an individual
and the covered entity has no reasonable basis to believe it can be used to
identify that person.
Clearly, the former is easily accomplished; it is the
latter that remains problematic for any covered entity submitting a grievance.
Equally problematic is the organization which seeks sufficient information to
properly adjudicate a grievance, since it is likely that the parties will tender
some form of PHI. This will make it easy to identify the patient whose care
and treatment became the subject of this expert's testimony.
Accordingly, the best and most pragmatic approach is for any such
organization to amend the rules of its Professional Conduct Program.
Specifically, organizations should amend their rules to require prior patient
authorization that complies with the state law of the patient's residence
before any proceedings on a grievance filed by a physician can be initiated.
Furthermore, the rules should be amended to only permit consideration of
medical information that is part of the public record of a malpractice claim
absent such an authorization. The pitfalls are that patients are unlikely to
give an authorization for a proceeding to which they are not a party and which
was initiated by the very physician against whom the patient has just resolved
a malpractice claim. This requirement could well be the death knell of
Professional Conduct Programs as they are currently constituted.
A substitute for a patient authorization could be a court order permitting
the parties to disclose the patient's PHI. The following is suggested as a
revision to the procedural rules governing Professional Conduct Programs:
This organization shall also accept a court order obtained at the expense of
the Claimant, permitting this organization and members of its grievance
and grievance appeals committees, and Respondent and its legal counsel
where retained, to receive PHI from the Claimant as the covered entity and
member of this organization filing a grievance, or from his or her business
associate(s), arising from the legal or administrative proceeding from
which expert witness medical testimony provided by the member of this
organization was received or admitted into evidence or testimony. Any
such order shall provide for the disclosure, use, maintenance and
disposition of the PHI or what would be considered PHI by this
organization in compliance and in conformity with applicable federal laws
and regulations.
A second approach, although it may impose a requirement that may be

207.
208.

45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (emphasis added).
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impossible to satisfy, would be to amend the rules for Professional Conduct
Programs to require the parties to comply with HIPAA's de-identification
standard as expressed in this article. The following language is offered as a
template:
No grievance and materials submitted with it shall be accepted for
consideration without an affidavit under oath submitted by the Claimant
attesting to compliance with the de-identification requirement mandated
by the Health Insumnce Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) so
that any protected health information (PHI), as that term is defined in this
act, will not disclose the identity of the patient. This means that the name
of the patient whose care and treatment was the subject of the Respondentmember's expert witness medical testimony is not identified and there does
not exist a reasonable basis that the identity of the patient can be identified
from such protected health infornation. If the Claimant in good faith
believes that a reasonable basis exists to identify the patient from the PHI,
then the Claimant must provide as part of the grievance either (1) a signed
and notarized authorization from the patient to allow the patient's PHI to
be used as part of the grievance and this organization's use of it until its
administrative proceedings are concluded, or (2) provide an attestation that
any PHI submitted as part of the grievance and the organization's
consideration of it arises from documentation already of public record,
such as made part of an underlying administrative or legal proceeding.
While the above options are self-regulating because they ask each private
organization to amend or add to their rules, problems are inherent in doing
so. Some organizations reference HIPAA, some reference de-identification,
and no doubt others never mention privacy.
There is no uniformity. Then
again, different documents can be disseminated to the membership, published
on the organizations' websites, or included in the public record in a lawsuit's
published pleadings (see Appendix A and B).0 As demonstrated, a private
organization, its grievance committees, or anyone with a computer can reidentify the patient's identity with considerable ease.0
A final option, though the least likely due to its difficulty, is to amend the
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) relating to "covered
entities," "business associates" or "health care operations," to provide
uniformity among all medical organizations whose rules address expert

209.
AM. Ass'N OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 52, at 7; AANS Procedural
Guidelines, supra note 5; Soc'Y FOR VASCULAR SURGERY, supra note 127.
210.
See generally supra, Section III. THE SUBMISSION OF PHI TO PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT PROGRAMS.
211.
CHRIS CULNANE ET AL., HEALTH DATA IN AN OPEN WORLD: A REPORT ON REIDENTIFYING PATIENTS IN THE MB S/PB S DATASET AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE

RELEASES OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DATA 1 (Univ. of Melbome, 2017),

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05627.pdf.
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medical witness opinion and testimony.E This is particularly warranted
given that the present regulations exempt certain groups of physicians,
including those involved in ensuring uality assurance, peer review, patient
safety, and public health and safety.
This leaves out those physicians
constituting one or more committees that are selected by their respective
organizations to investigate and hear grievances filed against organization
members that have provided opinion or testimony, or both, as expert medical
witnesses.E5
Thus, this article proffers the following, in the alternative or in conjunction
with one or more ofthe suggested amendments to the C.F.R., to be considered
by Congress, HHS, and lobbyists speaking for medical specialty
organizations.
Adding to the definition of "business associate" in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 is
one approach to consider. A new subparagraph (iii) to paragraph (1) could
be inserted to include a person who, with respect to a covered entity:
Receives a grievance from the covered entity arising out of expert medical
witness opinion or testimony given by a third party and who provides rules
or procedures that govern the filing of any such grievance. Also included
would be the Respondent to the grievance.
A new subparagraph (iv) could be added to paragraph (3) of the definition
to expressly include as a business associate: "A medical specialty
organization or similarly situated entity that governs its membership relating
to the offering of expert medical witness opinion or testimony. Also included
would be the person that is the subject of the grievance."
Alternatively, the definition of "covered entity" in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103
could be amended to add a new subparagraph (4) to enlarge the definition of
the term to include: "A medical specialty organization or other entity that
governs its members providing expert medical witness opinion or testimony,
including parties involved in any grievance challenging the testimony of that
member."
Another approach would be to amend 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 to add
subparagraph (6)(vi) to the definition of "health care operations" to include
the following as a business management and general administrative activity
of a covered entity: "[a] medical specialty organization or similarly
established entity that has provisions as part of its rules those that govern
expert medical witness opinion or testimony provided by any of its
members."
Absent patient consent for the use of PHI in a grievance or in a public
212.
213.
214.

See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014).
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014).
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014).
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record, these proposed amendments would provide that when a grievance is
filed by a member of the organization, the organization and the respondent
automatically become covered entities, or business associates, of the
aggrieved health care provider filing the grievance. By expanding the
definition of covered entity, the expansion of "health care operations" would
allow the organization and its grievance committees, together with the
participants, to be exempted from the de-identification requirement anising
from unlawful use of PHI.
VII. CONCLUSION

-

As the claimant is likely the only covered entity involved in a grievance
proceeding involving a physician's expert testimony, the burdens of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule fall more heavily on him or her, particularly if they
wish to submit PHI to a Professional Conduct Program. This article first
posits a "best measure to undertake" to overcome the roadblocks imposed by
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and state privacy laws when an organization seeks
to examine the expert medical witness testimony offered by one of its
members. The gold standard for any Professional Conduct Program should
be the amendment of its rules to require an authorization from the subject
patient for the release of his or her PHI before any proceedings can be
initiated on a grievance filed by a physician. Absent such an authorization,
the rules should only permit the consideration of medical information that is
part of the public record of a malpractice claim.
To reiterate, when an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical
information occurs in a grievance proceeding, the only available remedies
may be for the patient to bring an action against the treating physician for
injunctive relief or damages under state law, file a complaint with the OCR
or for a member of the organization to bring a grievance of their own for
violation of the organization's confidentiality rules. Equally true, the
organization should be mindful of the role that it plays in encouraging the
violation of patient confidentiality in the name of regulating expert
testimony.
Both the organization and the parties to a grievance must recognize that
complacency as a substitute for ensuring the privacy of patients' PHI is not
acceptable. Organizations' rules requiring the parties to merely eliminate a
patient's name or other explicitly identifiable markers that will identify the
patient is woefully insufficient if not unlawful given the ease with which
information about the underlying medical malpractice litigation can be found.
It would be incredulous if such an attitude reflected in these entities'
administrative rules continued to exist given the contents of this writing. The
goal must be to find a proper balance between allowing healthcare
organizations to police their members who testify as medical experts
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principally in medical malpractice cases - and requiring full compliance with
state and federal law.
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APPENDIX

A. Response of the AANS Board of Directors to the Appeal by J. Martin
Barrash, M.D.
B. American Society of Anesthesiologists Committee on Expert Witness
Testimony Review Findings Regarding Expert Witness Testimony by
Ronald L. Katz, M.D.
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RESPONSE OF THE AANS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
TO THE APPEAL BY J MARTIN BARRASH. M.D.

pkncr 8473780500

The AANS Board of Directors voted to censure Dr. Barrash

-

because in his testimony in the underlying lawsuit he: (1) Failed to

review all of the relevant and available medical material (specifically

the diagnostic imaging studies) prior to testifying; and (2) Failed at
Mtr64612
Swt
owt

times to provide unbiased testimony. The fact that the Professional
Conduct Committee and Board of Directors agreed with some of Dr.

Barrash's citicisms of the treating physician's delayed diagnosis and
treatment of the patient does not excuse or make acceptable his

otherwise unprofessicrnal testimony.
CLINICAL BACKGROUND
TroMipr

The patient was a forty year old man when he underwent a two level

instrumented posterior lumbar interbody fusion by Dr. Oishi on
RAlph G. Dasy
lbtnqY B. mpfw
&Di LiRonx

February 2, 2004.

His pre-operative symptoms stemmed from an

industrial accident approximately four weeks previously.

He was

seen in December 2003, and was found to be neurologically intact,
StThnn3 L, Frmcelh

Imaging demonstrated two level degenerative disc disease at L4-5
Sim UsL

Irrwa

Eitrv frta

and LS-S1 With moderate stenosis. No motion films were obtained.
Immediatety post-operatively, he awakened With severe left leg pain
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https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol28/iss1/5

38

on 08/08/14
Page
22 of 32
Document
80-23
in TXSD
Case 4:13-cv-01054
Zaremski and Belofsky:
HIPAA'S Privacy
Rule Filed
and State
Privacy Laws:
Roadblocks to
Medica

which had not been noted before the operation, as the major pre-operative

complaint had been low back pain. No further imaging was obtained during the
initial hospitalization.

Perioperative antibiotics were administrated and he was

discharged on February 6, with analgesics for his back and leg pain and a seven
day course of Keflex.
The patient's wife noted some oozing from the wound, and he was seen
by Dr. Olshi's physician assistant on February 12. A small amount of drainage
and swelling were noted and the staples were removed. There was no evidence
of infection abcording to Dr. Oishi. On February 20, the patient was seen by a

physician assistant from Dr. Oishi's office as Dr. Oishi was unavailable. Some
drainage was noted.
Because the left leg pain had continued and was severe, a second
operation was performed on Match 7, at which time a portion of the L5-S1

interbody graft was driled away to relieve possible nerve root pressure, and the
fixation system was modified. This second operation relieved the leg pain. No

infection was evident at the second operation according to Dr. Dishi.
On March 24, the staples were removed by a physician assistant and a
small "scab' was noted. On March 30, the patient developed fever ranging from
102 to,103 degrees. On April 3, his wife noted intermittent but copious drainage
of greenish purulent material. He was seen in the office and the wound was
found to be slightly erythematous and swollen, but not draining at the time. No
cultures were taken nor were an ESR nor CRP obtained, but a WBC was normal.
He was given Cipro. [The wound continued to drain according to his wife. On
April 14, he saw Dr. Oishi with a severe cough. A chest CT was ordered and
obtained on April 16. The report of this-study indicated a peuihepatic cystic

AANSB_00488
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lesion. About ten days later, on April 27, Dr. Oishi called the patient and advised
him to contact his primary physician, Dr. Trippe. Because of severe pain and
fever, and the radiographic findings, Dr. Trippe prescribed Timentin and admitted
him to the hospital on May 11. Infectious disease consultation was obtained and
he was switched to Zosyn.

The perihepatic cystic lesion was aspirated and

confirmed the diagnosis of an abscess.

Cultures grew out staphylococcus

aureus. A third operation was carried out on May 13, to remove the hardware
and debride the wound.
After a prolonged hospitalization and successful treatment of his infection,

he recovered, but was left with chronic pain, instability, and depression. He was
unable to wodk and required treatment by a pain management specialist.
Ultimately, a fourth operation was done for stabilization on January 13, 2006,
The outcome of this procedure was not made available to the PCC.

The patient and his wife contacted an attorney who in turn retained Dr.
Barrash and filed suit against Or. Oishi in the District Court of McLennan County,
Texas, Dr. Barrash's deposition was taken. The lawsuit was settled out of court
and did not proceed to trial Dr. Oishi then filed a complaint against Dr. Barrash
with the AANS' Professional Conduct Committee, which concluded that a hearing

was warranted.
DR. BARRASH'S TESTIMONY
The primary issues which Dr. Barrash felt supported a negligence lawsuit

against Dr. Oishi included: 1) Failure to aggressively pursue, identify, and treat
the cause of the patient's postoperative left leg pain which Dr. Barrash attributed
most likely to the interbody graft having been incorrectly positioned at surgery;
2) failure to promptly recognize and adequately pursue, identify, and treat a

ANS-.BP0489
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probable serious post-operative infection; 3) failure to obtain prompt consultation;
4) failure to manage perioperative antibiotic therapy correctly; 5) delegation of
care to assistants when such care would more appropriately have been rendered
by the surgeon; and 6) that these failures caused the need for a delayed fusion

surgery, a chronic pain syndrome, depression, and inability to work.

During his deposition, in addition to his criticisms of Dr Oishi's failure to
timely identify and treat the infection, criticisms with which the PCC is in
agreement, Dr, Barrash's testimony also included statements-that Dr. Oishi
probably incorrectly positioned an interbody graft at the first surgery. However, Dr
Barrash never reviewed any of the imaging studies prior to- making this
statement. In addition, Dr. Barrash last operated as a primary surgeon in 1999 or
2000. Dr Barrash stated that posterior hardware will prevent graft retropulsion,
-

and that Dr. Oishi's surgery which took four hours should only have required 2
21/2 hours and that the four hour surgery indicates inexperience.
DR. OISHYS CHARGES

Dr. Oishfs complaints' from his letters of November 10, 2008 and

November 24, 2008 include:
A.

Failure by Dr. Barrash to provide impartial testimony;

B.

Failure by Dr. Barrash to review all pertinent available medical
information;

C.

Failure by Dr. Barrash to allow for differing medical opinions; and

D.

That Dr. Barrash did not have sufficient training and recent surgical

experience to be competent to testify in this case.
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BRIEF HEARING SUMMARY

The hearing took place in New Orleans on Sunday Oct 25 2009. Present
were Dr. Oishi, Dr. Barrash and his attomey Dr. Clark Watts, PCC members Ben
Blackett chairman, Dr. Volker Sonntag, Dr. Clarence Watridge, Dr. Roberto
Heros, Dr. Stephen Giannotta, and Dr. Hal Hankinson.
Dr. Oishi made an abbreviated presentation without reviewing orally his

prior written submissions. He presented the intraoperative X-ray showing the
intervertebral grafts and the posterior instrumentation including the pedicle

screws.
Dr. Barrash addressed the claim that he was not competent to testify on
this case saying that although he had not bperated as primary surgeon since
1999, he did assiston about 50 spine surgeries per year. He answered the
charge that he was not spine fellowship trained saying that he had helped train

some of he people who now have spine fellowships. He discussed his criticisms
of Dr. Oishi's failure to do a timely evaluation of his patient's infection symptoms
and explained his theory that the contralateral leg pain and relative graft fixation

at the second surgery indicated that the graft was probably not positioned
correctly at the first surgery.
The intraoperative X-ray was reviewed by Dr. Olshi, Dr. Barrash and the
committee members and there was no disagreement that the grafts appeared to
be properly placed on these films. Dr. Barrash agreed that it would have been

better if he had looked at these films before testifying but that the attorney had
not provided any X-rays for him to examine.
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
Infection:

The PCC had no criticism of Dr. Barrash's testimony that Dr. Oishi fell
below the neurosurgical standard of care in falling to provide a timely diagnosis
and treatment of the patients postoperative wound infection.
Charges of inexperience:
Dr. Dishi charged that Dr. Barrash lacks the experience to be testifying
about Dr. Oishi's spinal surgery since Dr. Barrash was not fellowship trained in

spinal surgery and has not been the primary surgeon on any spinal surgeries
since 1999.

The AANS has no rule requiring a neurosurgical witness to be

actively participating as a primary surgeon nor that a spine fellowship is required,
and evaluates testimony only on the basis of the testimony itself. Dr. Oishis

charges on these counts were dismissed.
Dr. Barrash testified in his deposition that the two level lumbar fusion by
PLIF and lumbar pedicle instrumentation should have taken only two hours and

that the four hours taken by Dr. Oishi was a result of his inexperience. The PCC
did not consider four hours to complete the two level PLIF along with posterior

pedicle instrumentation to be particularly exceptional and certainly not indicative
of inexperience of the operating surgeon. Whether this statement by Dr. Barrash
was intentional misrepresentation through improper advocacy or lack of sufficient

subject matter knowledge is unclear but either way it was prejudicial and
unprofessional. Although Dr. Barrash made no mention of his confusion at either
the PCC hearing, or later before the AANS Board of Directors, he now states that
he had failed to realize during his deposition that Dr. Olshi had performed a two
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level decompression and a two level instrumented fusion.
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We think that his

recently expressed apology to Dr. Oishi for this testimony is appropriate.
Failure to Review:
Dr. Barrash never personally reviewed the imaging studies relevant to this
litigation, yet he testified that an interspace bone graft was probably improperly
placed during the first surgery. Dr. Barrash based this assertion upon the relative
fixation of the graft noted at the second surgery on March 7, 2004, the presence
of posterior instrumentation and the left leg pain following the first surgery and
relieved after the second surgery. The intraoperative x-rays of February 2, 2004
were reviewed by the PCC members during the hearing on October 25, 2009 and
the graft appeared to the PCC members to be irr proper position at both the L4-5
and L5-S1 interspaces and with the posterior instrumentation also properly
placed. Dr. Barrash. defended his failure to review these and other x-rays saying
that they were not obtained for him by the plaintiffs attorney. Reluctance of the
other side to provide relevant medical records or films is not an acceptable
excuse.

Active discovery was underway in this case and subpoenas or court

orders to produce documents or films are almost always available. Dr. Barrash
could and should have declined to testify about the graft placement at surgery
until he had been provided the relevant imaging studies. Dr. Barrash's failure to
insist on seeing the films before testifying on this issue or rendering a written
opinion was contrary to Rule B2 of the AANS Rules for Neurosurgical MedicaljLegal
Expert Opinion Services and was unprofessional in addition to having been, in the
opinion of the PCC members and later the AANS Board of Directors, incorrect
about the graft position at the time of surgery.
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Chronic Pain Syndrome:
Dr. Barrash in his letter to attorney Michael Miller of August 10, 2008
wrote that
"[The patient] now has a chronic pain problem, not from the surgery,

not from the injury, but from the lack of following the standard for rapid
treatment of a suspected and then confirmed infection. Were it not for
the negligence on the part of Dr. Oishi in not recognizing ' and
addressing the infection that was smoldering in [the patient], his
condition today would not be one of chronic pain, disability, and the

attendant depression and hopelessness."
Chronic pain syndromes can follow injuries without surgery. and surgery
with or without complications. For Dr. Barrash to say that the failure to property
identify and treat the infection caused a chronic pain syndrome can only be
speculation, and to assert it as the proximate cause of ongoing pain damages is
improper advocacy.
The PCC concluded that

notwithstanding Dr. Barrash's appropriate

criticism of Dr. Oishfs delayed diagnosis and treatment of the patients
postoperative wound infection, Dr. Barrash did fail to review all of the relevant

and available records before testifying, and failed at times to provide unbiased
testimony. The unprofessional testimony described above was significant was
not de minimis, and in the opinion of the PC, warranted a six-month suspension
of membership.

The Board of Directors, recognizing the impropriety of that testimony, but.
also acknowledging the correctness of some of Dr. Barrash's criticisms, reduced
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that sanction to a censure. A censure, white considered a disciplinary action, is
not reportable to the National Practitioners Databank.
We feel compelled to respond to another issue which Dr. Barrash has
raised in his appeal. Dr. Barrash asserts that there was bias against him by a
particular member of the PCC. Dr. Barrash raised no objections to this individual
participating in the PCC hearing and when Dr. Barrash raised this issue for the
first time before the- Board, he presented no actual evidence that the PCC
Nevertheless, he now cites an

article by that PCC member in supposed support of his position.

-

member in question was biased against him.

Finally, to clarify a point ofAANS history raised by Dr. Barrash, the PCC
was established to deal with complaints brought by one or more AANS members
against one or more other members. Often these complaints have originated
from medical malpractice lawsuit testimony. as were the complaints in this
instance.

The AANS has consistently encouraged appropriate testimony,

whether for the plaintiff or the defendant.
The Board asks that you support its decision that Dr. Barrash be
Censured for unprofessional conduct while appearing as an expert witness in a
legal proceeding.

James Rutka, M.D.

AANS President
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TAB B
Committee on Expert Witness Testimony Review
Findings Regarding Expert Witness Testimony
by Ronald L. Katz, M.D.

In March 2011, the Judicial Council affirmed the findings of the Committee on Expert Witness
Testimony Review and recommendation that ASA member Ronald L. Katz, M.D. be censured
for failure to abide by ASA Guidelines for Expert Witness Qualifications and Testimony
("Guidelines").
In accordance with the ASA Bylaws and Administrative Procedures, a
resolution for censure was referred to the ASA Board of Directors and considered by the Special
Board Committee on Expert Witness Testimony Review. In November 2011, the Board
censured ASA member Ronald L. Katz, M.D.
Pursuant to ASA Administrative Procedure 11.8.7, the Committee Findings affirmed by the
Judicial Council are posted below.

FINDINGS
A.

Background
1.

ASA member David B. Zucker, M.D. brought a Complaint against Ronald L.

Katz, M.D. alleging that Dr. Katz failed to abide by the ASA Guidelines with respect to expert
witness testimony given in Patient v. Toledo Hospital, [Case No.] (Court of Common Pleas,
County of Lucas, Ohio) (the "Case").
2.

Dr. Katz offered expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff in the Case, including

trial testimony on October 22, 2003.1 Dr. Zucker was a defendant in the Case. The jury in the
Case returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The verdict was appealed, and while the appeal
was pending, the case was settled and the appeal then dismissed. Dr. Katz and Dr. Zucker are
members of the ASA and are bound by the ethical requirements set forth in the ASA Guidelines.
3.

We find that the matter is properly within our jurisdiction as prescribed by ASA

Bylaws and Administrative Procedures.

Dr. Unruh, Chairman of the Committee, asked Dr.

I Dr. Katz also provided deposition testimony in the Case; however, the deposition occurred prior to the effective
date of the ASA Expert Witness Testimony Review Program and therefore is not subject to review.
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Patrick Birmingham,

Dr. Robert B. Fisher, and Dr. Terry Walman (the "Committee

Investigators") to evaluate the allegations in the Complaint concerning Dr. Katz's testimony and
to make a recommendation to the Committee on whether Dr. Katz's testimony raised a
substantial question concerning compliance with the ASA Guidelines.

After reviewing the

Complaint and supporting material and Dr. Katz's written Response and supporting material, the
Committee Investigators determined that certain allegations in the Complaint raised a substantial
question concerning compliance with the ASA Guidelines and recommended that the Committee
hold a hearing on those allegations. The Committee agreed with the Committee Investigators'
recommendation,

and the Committee held an oral hearing on September 29, 2010 (the

"September 29 Hearing"), at which it heard testimony and argument on behalf of the Committee
Investigators and Dr. Katz.
4.

The patient in the Case was a 55-year old female who presented in the emergency

room with abdominal pain.

[Medical Records at 39.]

She had a medical history of colitis,

hypertension, coronary artery disease, hyperlipidemia, GERD, and diabetes mellitus type II.
[Medical Records at 41.] She had not had a bowel movement for 24 hours and had no flatus.
[Medical Records at 39.]

According to the emergency center report, "[s]he has had some

vomiting earlier" but "[s]he has had no vomiting lately."

[Medical Records at 39.]

The

provisional diagnosis on the emergency center report was "partial small bowel obstruction."
[Medical Records at 40.] She was admitted to the hospital on that date. According to the history
and physical report, the patient was made NPO and medications (Cardizem, Tenormin, Lipitor,
Prevacid, Glucophage, Neurontin) were to be continued "with sips only."

[Medical Records at

42-44.]

2
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5.

On the next day, the patient vomited once but had no stools or flatus. [Medical

Records at 47.] The patient underwent a CT scan, which suggested some small bowel dilation.
[Medical Records at 54.]

According to the operative report by the surgeon, "[w]hen the pain

worsened, and the bowel sounds started to come in rushes, I felt that it was likely that [the
patient] had a small bowel obstruction that needed operative release." [Medical Records at 54.]
6.

The ER team, the primary care team, and the consulting surgeon elected not to

place a nasogastric tube. The patient arrived at the operating room at approximately 6:00 p.m.
where Dr. Zucker evaluated her. Dr. Zucker states in his Complaint: "I reviewed her medical
records and personally examined the patient. During my evaluation of the patient, she reported
no difficulty with previous anesthetics, and based on her physical examination, I anticipated no
difficulty with intubation." [Complaint at 2.]
7.

Dr. Zucker did not place a nasogastric tube.

sequence induction with cricoid pressure.

He elected to perform a rapid

CRNA William Boardman, with over 14 years of

experience, intubated the esophagus, which was immediately recognized. CRNA Rose Demain,
who had over 20 years of experience, then tried and again intubated the esophagus, which was
immediately recognized. Dr. Zucker then tried to intubate using a light wand but again intubated
the esophagus, which was immediately recognized. The patient was eventually intubated via a
LMA in conjunction with a fiberoptic bronchoscope by another anesthesiologist, Kevin Lodge,
M.D.
8.

The hearing focused on two areas of testimony by Dr. Katz:

(1) Dr. Katz's

testimony that Dr. Zucker breached the standard of care by allowing the patient's esophagus to
be intubated; and (2) Dr. Katz's testimony that Dr. Zucker violated the standard of care by failing
to ensure that a nasogastric tube was placed prior to induction of anesthesia.

3
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B.

Testimony Concerning Intubating the Esophagus.
9.

Dr. Katz testified that Dr. Zucker deviated from the standard of care by allowing

the patient's esophagus to be intubated. In considering this area of testimony, we reviewed all of
Dr. Katz's trial and deposition testimony and considered the context in which the testimony was
given.

In the following excerpt from his trial testimony, Dr. Katz sets forth his opinion on

intubating the esophagus and provides the bases for his opinion

--

all in response to questions

posed by the plaintiff s counsel:
12 Q. Is it a deviation of accepted standardof
13 care to put an endotracheal tube down an esophagus?
14 A. It depends upon the circumstances. Doing
15 esophageal intubation, per se, is not below the
16 standard of care. I have, in attempting to do an
17 endotracheal intubation, have attempted to do an
18 esophagus, recognized it, pulled it out, and put it in
19 the trachea. That can happen to anyone.
20 But in this case, given the circumstances
21 of a patient with a full stomach, to put the tube in
22 the esophagus is to fail to properly do a rapid
23 sequence induction and is below the standard of care.
24 Q. What is the primary cause of an
1 esophagealintubation, as opposed to getting the tube
2 in the trachea?
3 A. Well, It just means you didn't put it in
4 the right place. It can be because the patient has
5 unusual anatomy, which makes it difficult.
6 And the example I gave a minute ago where
7 I put the tube in the esophagus, that was in a patient
8 who had cancer surgery and their face was not normal.
9 So abnormal anatomy can be one cause.
10 A second cause can be inexperience of the
11 person doing it or the inability of the person to have
12 good intubation skills.
13 Q. Did you find any evidence in the records
14 or the depositions that Patient]had any
15 anatomicalabnormalities?
16 A. I asked you to send me pictures of her
17 face in certain positions so I could get an idea of
18 whether she had abnormal or unusual anatomy. Looking
19 at those pictures, I didn't see that she had any

4
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20 unusual anatomy.
21 If the anesthesia care team felt she had
22 unusual anatomy, I would have expected them to have
23 written a note in the chart about it, and I didn't
24 find such a note.
1 And, finally, this patient had several
2 other operations. Some before this case, before this
3 operation we were discussing, and I believe one
4 afterwards. In those four operations, there was no
5 evidence of any difficulty.
6 The reason I say that is that if a
7 patient has a difficult airway, the anesthesiologist
8 is supposed to tell the patient you are difficult.
9 And, in fact, when I encounter a patient with a
10 difficult airway that I can intubate, I advise them to
11 buy a med-alert bracelet, and the bracelet says I am a
12 difficult intubation.
13 I also give them a letter describing what
14 the problem is to give to the next anesthesiologist.
15 As far as I know, no one ever told the patient she was
16 a difficult intubation or that she had usual anatomy.
17 And In looking at the picture, it didn't look like she
18 had unusual anatomy to me.
19 Q. Doctor, do you have those photographs
20 handy?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. I've marked one of them. I have the
23 duplicate. I've marked it as Plaintiff'sExhibit 3,
24 and it's the frontalpicture of [Patient]
1 with her mouth open. Do you have thatpicture?
2 A. Yes, I can see that. That's this one
3 (indicating).
4 Q. What does that show you? Describefor us
5 what that's demonstrating.
6 A. It shows me a lot of things. It shows me
7 how widely she can open her mouth, which is good. She
8 has good mouth opening. And I can see a lot of the
9 anatomy of the patient, including the uvula back here
10 (indicating).
11 So looking in the patients mouth, that
12 tells me she can open it nicely and I can see pretty
13 far down. So that tells me she should be a
14 straightforward, pretty easy intubation.
15 Q. Doctor, if a patient has no other
16 abnormalitiesor problems present, do you have an
17 opinion to a reasonabledegree of medical probability

5
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18 whether it was a deviation of accepted standardof
19 care to place the endotrachealtube down the
20 esophagus?
21 A. Given the circumstances of this case, the
22 answer is yes.
[Trial Testimony of Ronald L. Katz dated October dated October 22, 2003 ("Katz Trial
Testimony") at 44:12 - 47:22.]
10.

In the Patient Case, Dr. Katz concluded that intubating the esophagus must have

been caused by Dr. Zucker's negligence because the patient did not appear from photographs to
have an unusual anatomy and because the patient did not have intubation problems in her other
surgeries. We find that this testimony from Dr. Katz violates ASA Guidelines B 1, B2, and B3.
11.

Guideline B 1 provides: "The physician's review of the medical facts should be

truthful, thorough and impartial and should not exclude any relevant information to create a view
favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant." Dr. Katz's testimony on intubating the esophagus
was neither thorough nor impartial.
12.

First, as Dr. Katz recognized elsewhere in his trial testimony and in a presentation

he gave at a conference for the Society of Ambulatory Anesthesia in 1998, many patients who
appear to have normal airways turn out to be difficult or impossible to intubate.

At trial, in

response to a question from Dr. Zucker's counsel, Dr. Katz testified as follows:
13
14
15
16
17
18

Q. Now,

Doctor, a patient can appearto have
a normal airway, but it turns out it's a difficult
intubation regardlessof that appearance;isn't that
correct?
A. Yes. I said that in my deposition, I
believe.

[Katz Trial Testimony at 64:13-18.] And, in his 1998 presentation, he said: "While in some of
the cases it should have been suspected there might be airway problems, this was not true in
many cases.

Patients who appeared to have normal airways were found to be difficult or

6
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impossible to intubate."

Dr. Katz also confirmed during the September 29 Hearing that

"notwithstanding appearances, sometimes a patient has an unrecognized difficult airway."
[Transcript from September 29 Hearing ("9/29/10 Hrg. Tr."), Vol. II at 12:16-19.]

In light of

these acknowledgments by Dr. Katz, we find that a thorough and impartial review of the medical
facts would not support Dr. Katz's reliance on photographs to conclude that the patient should
have been a "straightforward, pretty easy intubation." [Katz Trial Testimony at 47:14.]
13.

We also do not find Dr. Katz's reliance on the patient's supposed easy intubation

in other surgeries to be thorough or impartial. First, we note that Dr. Katz apparently assumed
that the patient did not have intubation problems with her other surgeries. He did not review the
medical records from those other surgeries or speak to the anesthesiologists involved in the other
surgeries. [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr., Vol. II at 15:2-10.]2 More importantly, we are not persuaded that
the absence of intubation problems in the patient's other surgeries establishes that negligence
caused the patient's intubation problems in the surgery at issue.
14.

Practice Guidelines for Management of the Difficult Airway (A Report by the

American Society of Anesthesiologists Task Force on Management of the Difficult Airway)
provides:

"The difficult airway represents a complex interaction between patient factors, the

clinical setting, and the skills and preferences of the practitioner."
Anesthesiology, V. 78, No. 3 (May 1993) at 597 (Record at 96).

Practice Guidelines,

In the surgery at issue, the

clinical setting was an emergency surgery to release a small bowel obstruction.

2

The patient's

Although we did not focus on any testimony from Dr. Katz's deposition with respect to potential violations of the

ASA Guidelines, Dr. Katz's counsel urged us to consider Dr. Katz's deposition testimony to understand the context
of Dr. Katz's opinions. With respect to the patient's other surgeries, Dr. Katz testified: "And actually, the eight
pictures that I have indicate to me that I would not expect her to be a difficult intubation and that fits with the four
other operations, three of which I'm sure were under general anesthesia, one of which I don't know whether it was
general or regional. That's the hysterectomy. It could have been done under general or regional. So at least several
of the operations were done under general anesthesia. I'm assuming she was intubated and they didn't have a
problem. And looking at the pictures, it looks to me like she'd be an easy intubation." [Deposition of Ronald Lewis
Katz dated November 20, 2002 ("Katz Dep.") at 13:3-13.]

7
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other surgeries include:

partial hysterectomy; oophorectomy; open cholecystectomy; and

appendectomy. Dr. Katz's testimony concerning the importance of the patient's other surgeries
does not take into account that the clinical settings of those surgeries were different than the
clinical setting of the surgery at issue. In fact, Dr. Katz could not even testify that all of the other
surgeries were under general anesthesia. [Katz Dep. at 13.]
15.

In short, given that patients who appear to have normal airways may turn out to be

difficult or impossible to intubate even when an anesthesiologist satisfies the standard of care -- a
fact recognized by Dr. Katz -- we find that Dr. Katz's reliance on the patient's photographs and
prior surgeries to conclude that Dr. Zucker acted negligently in allowing the patient's esophagus
to be intubated represents neither a thorough nor impartial review of the medical facts.
Accordingly, we find that Dr. Katz violated Guideline B 1.
16.

We also find that Dr. Katz's testimony on intubating the esophagus violates

Guideline B2, which provides:

"The physician's testimony should reflect an evaluation of

performance in light of generally accepted standards, reflected in relevant literature, neither
condemning performance that clearly falls within generally accepted practice standards nor
endorsing or condoning performance that clearly falls outside accepted medical practice." Dr.
Katz acknowledged on Page 44 of his trial testimony that intubating the esophagus "can happen
to anyone" and is not a per se violation of the standard of care. And, as discussed in Paragraph
12 above, he also acknowledged that despite appearances, a patient may turn out to have an
unrecognized difficult airway. In other words, Dr. Katz acknowledged that allowing a patient's
esophagus to be intubated does not per se fall outside of generally accepted practice standards.
Yet, he then condemns Dr. Zucker's performance as falling outside of generally accepted
practice standards on the basis that Dr. Zucker allowed the patient's esophagus to be intubated.

8
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Based on the record before us, Dr. Zucker's performance clearly falls within generally accepted
practice standards. Dr. Katz's testimony to the contrary violates ASA Guideline B2.
17.

We reviewed the literature submitted by Dr. Katz and find that it does not support

his testimony that because the patient appeared from photographs to be an easy intubation and
because the patient did not have intubation problems in her other surgeries, her intubation
problems in surgery at issue were the result of negligence by Dr. Zucker. For example, Practice
Guidelinesfor Management of a Difficult Airway (An Updated Report by the American Society
of Anesthesiologists Task Force on Management of the Difficult Airway) states:

"There is

insufficient published evidence to evaluate the effect of a bedside medical history on predicting
the presence of a difficult airway. Similarly, there is insufficient evidence to evaluate the effect
of reviewing prior medical records on predicting the presence of a difficult airway." Practice
Guidelines, Anesthesiology, V. 98, No. 5 (May 2003) at 1271 (Record at 104).
18.

Finally, we find that Dr. Katz violated Guideline B3, which provides:

"The

physician should make a clear distinction between medical malpractice and adverse outcomes
not necessarily related to negligent practice." Here, Dr. Katz did not make such a distinction.
Because the esophagus was intubated (an adverse outcome), Dr. Katz concluded that there must
have been negligent practice.

But as Dr. Katz acknowledged, intubating the esophagus can

happen to anyone and is not necessarily the result of any negligence.

Here, Dr. Katz fails to

provide an adequate explanation for why in this case intubating the esophagus was the result of
some type of negligent practice. Therefore, we find his testimony violates Guideline B3.
C.

Testimony Concerning Placement of a Nasogastric Tube.
19.

The September 29 Hearing also focused on Dr. Katz's testimony concerning the

placement of a nasogastric tube. Again, in considering this area of testimony, we reviewed all of

9
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Dr. Katz's trial and deposition testimony and considered the context in which the testimony was
given. In response to questions from plaintiff s counsel, Dr. Katz testified as follows concerning
the placement of a nasogastric tube:
14 Q. Priorto her surgery on [Date],
15 1999, had any physician placed a nasogastrictube in
16 [Patien]tto decompress her stomach?
17 A. No.
18 Q. In your opinion. was that a deviation of
19 accepted standardof care?
20 A. Absolutely. That's Anesthesia 1-A
21 That's Medicine 1 -A.
22 Q. Do you hold that opinion to a reasonable
23 degree of medical probability?
24 A. Yes.
1 Q. Doctor, earlier, you mentioned the
2 anesthesiologistworking I think you said as a
3 teammate of the surgeon.
4 Who should have placed the nasogastric
5 tube in [Patient] to decompress her stomach
6 during her surgery at approximately 6:15 on [Date]?
8 A. Well, the usual practice is for the
9 surgeon to place it, so I believe the surgeon should
10 have put it in in this case initially.
11 Q. And you've already told us no one did, so
12 if the surgeonfails to do it, does anyone else have
13 the responsibility to place a nasogastrictube?
14 A. If the surgeon fails to do it, it then
15 becomes the responsibility of the anesthesiologist to
16 pass it. The example that I've used in teaching
17 medical students is that the surgeon is the linebacker
18 in this case, but if the player gets past the
19 linebacker, then the anesthesiologist is the safety
20 man, because he has the last chance to prevent the
21 touchdown or prevent damage from occurring to the
22 patient.
23 So it's the primary responsibility of the
24 surgeon. If the surgeon fails, then It's up to the
1 anesthesiologist to do it.
[Katz Trial Testimony at 33:14 - 35:1.]
20.
15

At the September 29 Hearing, Dr. Katz affirmed his testimony:

Q.

Dr. Katz, as I understood your testimony in the
10
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
1

Patient trial and today, it is your opinion that the
standard of care requires the placement of a nasogastric
tube in all patients with a presumed full stomach; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. So, it's your testimony that it is not a judgment
call by an anesthesiologist?
A. That's correct.

[9/29/10 Hrg. Tr. Vol. II at 10:15-11:01.]
21.

We find that Dr. Katz's testimony on the placement of a nasogastric tube violates

Guideline B2 because he condemns performance that clearly falls within generally accepted
practice standards.

Dr. Katz testified that the standard of care mandated the placement of a

nasogastric tube because the patient had a full stomach.

He told the jury that placing a

nasogastric tube in a patient with a full stomach was elementary; it was "Anesthesia 1-A." We
do not agree. Placing a nasogastric tube in a patient with a full stomach is a judgment call, and
we find that anesthesiologists could reasonably differ on whether to place a nasogastric tube
under the circumstances of this Case.
22.

Because anesthesiologists

could reasonably differ on whether to place a

nasogastric tube under the circumstances of this Case, Dr. Katz improperly condemned Dr.
Zucker's decision not to place a nasogastric tube.

Dr. Zucker's decision not to place a

nasogastric tube under the circumstances of the case and to perform a rapid sequence induction
with application of cricoid pressure clearly falls within generally accepted practice standards.
Dr. Katz's testimony to the contrary violates Guideline B2.
23.

Moreover, Dr. Katz did not limit his testimony to the circumstances of this Case.

Rather, he broadly and absolutely stated that placing a nasogastric tube in a patient with a
presumed full stomach is the standard of care. During the September 29 Hearing, the Committee
questioned Dr. Katz regarding the broad and absolute nature of his opinion, and Dr. Katz

11
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responded: "Well, you know, I feel very strongly that -- you know, and the term -- I think it's
Barash uses the term incumbent. And, to me, that means you have to do it, and I agree with that.
Unless there's a contraindication to pass a nasogastric tube, it needs to be done in a patient with
full stomach." [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr., Vol. II at 20:4-9.] We do not dispute that Dr. Katz strongly
believes that a nasogastric tube should be placed in any patient with a presumed full stomach
(unless there is a contraindication), but we find that this is a personal belief of Dr. Katz's that
does not accurately reflect the standard of care.
24.

Dr. Katz provided literature that identified placement of a nasogastric tube as one

method that may be used to reduce the risk of regurgitation and aspiration. Dr. Katz argues that
because the literature recommends the method that he testified was mandated, his testimony is
supported by the literature.

However, the fact that the literature recommends that an

anesthesiologist consider a specific procedure to reduce the risk of aspiration does not mean that
the recommended procedure is the only acceptable and appropriate method to be utilized or that
other alternative methods cannot be employed.
25.

The Committee Investigators proved the foregoing violations of the Guidelines by

clear and convincing evidence. The Complaint also contended that Dr. Katz's testimony violated
the Guidelines in several other respects; however, the Committee Investigators did not pursue
those allegations at the hearing.
D.

Other Challenges Raised by Dr. Katz at the September 29 Hearing.
26.

Dr. Katz's counsel argued at the September 29 Hearing that the testimony

identified by the Committee Investigators as violating the ASA Guidelines was excerpted and
taken out of context. We reject this argument for several reasons. First, we note that we have
reviewed and considered all of the material provided by both Dr. Zucker and Dr. Katz in this
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proceeding, including the entirety of Dr. Katz's trial and deposition testimony.

Therefore, we

have considered the testimony identified by the Committee Investigators in the context it was
given by Dr. Katz. Dr. Katz's counsel urged that we consider Dr. Katz's deposition testimony
because it provided context for Dr. Katz's opinions. We have considered Dr. Katz's deposition
testimony and find it to be consistent with Dr. Katz's trial testimony. We specifically considered
the passages that Dr. Katz's counsel identified on pages 45 and 50 of the deposition testimony,
where Dr. Katz testified that the deviations from the standard of care that he identified (including
failing to place a nasogastric tube and intubating the esophagus) together caused the aspiration.
This is consistent with Dr. Katz's trial testimony (at page 50) on causation. However, contrary
to the statements of Dr. Katz's counsel at the September 29 Hearing (at page 105-106), Dr. Katz
did not testify in his deposition or at trial that the combination of intubating the esophagus,
failing to place the nasogastric tube, and failing to reduce the acidity of the gastric contents in the
stomach deviated from the standard of care. Rather, he testified that each of these three things
separately and independently deviated from the standard of care and that the combination of
them caused the aspiration.

The focus of the September 29 Hearing was not on Dr. Katz's

causation opinion but on whether it was a deviation from the standard of care to intubate the
esophagus and whether it was a deviation of the standard of care to fail to place a nasogastric
tube. The passages identified from Dr. Katz's deposition do not address these issues.
27.

During the September 29 Hearing, Dr. Katz's counsel also argued that the entire

record from the Case must be considered to reach a decision in this proceeding.

We have not

identified any additional material from the Case that we believe we need to review in order to
reach a decision in this matter but that was not provided to us by either Dr. Katz or Dr. Zucker.
To the extent that Dr. Katz believes that there is testimony that we did not have in our possession
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that we should have reviewed, he had an opportunity in these proceedings to submit any material
he wished for us to review.
28.

Dr. Katz's counsel also argued in the September 29 Hearing that Dr. Katz's

testimony was constrained by the questions he was asked by defense counsel. Again, we reject
this argument. First, we do not find that Dr. Katz's testimony on intubating the esophagus or
placing the nasogastric tube was constrained by any of the questions posed to him. Rather, his
trial testimony and the opinions he provided on these two issues were fully consistent with his
testimony at the September 29 Hearing. In fact, the key testimony we cite in Paragraphs 9 and
19 above is testimony that Dr. Katz provided on the standard of care and was testimony that Dr.
Katz provided in support of the plaintiff and in response to questions from plaintiffs -- not
defense -- counsel. As Dr. Katz acknowledged at the September 29 Hearing, his standard of care
opinions were fully and completely provided to the jury. [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr. Vol. II at 16-17.] In
general, we reject the implication made by such an argument that an expert witness cannot be
expected to comply with the ASA Guidelines when being questioned by opposing counsel. The
ASA Guidelines apply regardless of which counsel is asking the questions. An expert witness
can respond to the questions asked and still comply with the ASA Guidelines.
29.

In stating his or her opinion as to what is accepted medical practice, the expert

witness must provide a fair, objective and unbiased presentation of the facts and accepted
treatment options. In fact, ethical guidelines -- such as Guideline B 1 -- obligate medical experts
to acknowledge plausible alternative treatment options or modes of practice, even if the expert
witness would not herself or himself employ such treatment options or modes of practice. Under
Guideline B 1, it is improper to define the standard of care so narrowly to only encompass the
mode of practice preferred by the expert witness when other acceptable treatment options exist.
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Otherwise, the expert's testimony could not be presented "unchanged for use by either the
plaintiff or defendant" as required by Guideline B 1.
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